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Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence
Ken Chasse†

Abstract

T

he new electronic record provisions that are now part of almost all of the Evidence Acts in Canada are as
important as any statutory law or common law concerning the use of records as evidence. They bring six
important improvements to the evidentiary law of business records. It is argued, however, that their most serious
defects are that they: (1) perpetuate the best evidence rule — a rule rendered redundant by electronic records and
information management (RIM); (2) do not deal with hearsay issues; (3) do not cure the defects of the business
record provisions in regard to electronic records; and (4) unnecessarily complicate the law. But these defects can
be substantially lessened by judicial interpretation that accomplishes what the business records provisions should
have accomplished. Although a topic left to a future article, this article should be read with the assumption that
the electronic record provisions are interdependent with: (1) the new electronic commerce laws; (2) the new
personal privacy protection laws; (3) the new electronic discovery guidelines; (4) the new National Standards of
Canada concerning electronic RIM ; and (5) the records requirements of government agencies such as the Canada
Revenue Agency. This article is therefore a first step in justifying the emergence of the ‘‘RIM lawyer’’ as a new field
of legal practice.
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1. Introduction

electronic form can be judged by their own history — creation, storage, and handling. Electronic
records, however, must be judged by the quality
of the electronic record system from which they
come. The system integrity test of the electronic
record provisions is an objective test in that it can
be given both definition and application in
accord with independent, authoritative standards
such as the National Standards of Canada concerning electronic RIM. It sets a threshold of
admissibility high enough to effectively judge the
quality of the electronic records system from
which the electronic records in question come.
But the ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’
test of the business record provisions sets a low
threshold of admissibility. It is a subjective test
that accepts the quality of the record system from
which the records come as being what must be
accepted as the usual and ordinary course of business in regard to RIM. Therefore, it cannot be an
effective test of RIM quality. (Only by chance
might it be an effective test for judging the
quality of paper record systems, but not for electronic record systems.) Evidence in satisfaction of
the higher burden of proof should also satisfy the
lower burden of proof. Therefore, evidence that
satisfies the system integrity test of the electronic
record provisions should also satisfy the usual

T

his article is a review of the electronic record and
business record provisions of the Evidence Acts. 1 To
that end, it is intended to show that:
1. In the law of evidence concerning records and
documents, the distinction between hearsay and
best evidence rule issues is meaningless when
applied to electronic records. The best evidence
rule is not needed. The ‘‘system integrity test’’ of
the electronic record provisions of the federal,
provincial, and territorial Evidence Acts is the
only test needed.
2. Therefore, there are three ‘‘procedural’’ reasons
why satisfying the electronic record provisions
with sufficient evidence should be held to satisfy
the business record provisions as well: (1) the law
reflects the reality that electronic technology
needs no distinction between hearsay rule and
best evidence rule issues; (2) it enables procedural
simplicity, i.e., it is a one-step procedure; and (3)
an effective burden of proof is cast where it
should be — upon the party adducing the
records in question.
3. There is also a substantive reason why evidence
that satisfies the electronic record provisions also
satisfies the business record provisions. The
quality of paper records that have never been in
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and ordinary course of business test of the business record provisions.
4. Important hearsay issues concerning the business
record provisions remain unanswered.
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5. The vagueness and uncertainty of the business
record provisions in the Evidence Acts causes
these defects: (1) the uncertainty the litigant faces
as to how they will be applied, meaning uncertainty as to what evidence to marshall for court;
(2) inconsistent court decisions; and (3) court
decisions that bring back the old common law
requirements they were intended to replace.
6. The fact that the caselaw concerning business
records shows no difficulty in regard to hearsay
issues is not a valid reason for the failure of the
Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (the UEEA), 2
and of the Evidence Acts that incorporated it as
their electronic record provisions, to deal with
hearsay issues concerning electronic records.
That caselaw also shows no difficulty in dealing
with best evidence rule issues. Nevertheless, the
electronic record provisions were necessary and
do provide important improvements to the law.
If the courts are not given issues to decide, the
courts and the caselaw will not decide them. The
silence of caselaw does not justify the silence of
legislation. The impact of electronic technology
upon law and practice, and its rapid change,
should lead to the conclusion that legislation is
needed before the law is demonstrably inadequate. Otherwise, too much damage is done.
That is why legislating the electronic record provisions was justified, albeit for the reasons argued
herein, not in their present form.
7. The underlying theory of the usual and ordinary
course of business test of the business record provisions of the Evidence Acts is losing its validity. It
is a subjective test providing only a low threshold
of admissibility. The theory is that good RIM is
sufficiently guaranteed by the profit motive.
There are now more reasons why good RIM
might be seen to be contrary to the best interests
of the record keepers. Preventing loss can be
more important than maximizing profit. Therefore, the ‘‘circumstances of the making of the
record’’ test of the business record provisions
should be interpreted as though it were a record
system, system integrity test comparable to the
system integrity test of the electronic record provisions. The double usual and ordinary course of
business tests of those provincial Evidence Acts
that contain this phrase could be given a similar
interpretation.
Therefore, this article reaches conclusions contrary
to the following statement by John D. Gregory:

The rules on hearsay are generally accepted to present
no special problems for the admission of electronic records.
The medium on which indirect evidence is stored does not
alter the characteristics of that evidence as hearsay. As a
result, the law dealing with the hearsay aspect of documentary evidence has been able to handle electronic records
without difficulty. Indeed, the leading common law case on
documents, Ares v. Venner, 3 sets out rules that could be
applied as well to electronic as to paper records. Statutory
rules on documents have tended to follow. For example, the
Ontario Evidence Act has a codification of the business
records rule that defines ‘‘record’’ this way: ‘‘includes any
information that is recorded or stored by means of any
device’’. This kind of thinking led the Uniform Law Conference of Canada to omit rules on hearsay from the Uniform
Electronic Evidence Act. 4

2. UEEA Progeny — The Electronic
Record Provisions of the
Evidence Acts

E

lectronic records 5 give rise to a ‘‘best evidence rule’’
issue — that is what the electronic record provisions
declare. 6 The best evidence rule states that where a fact
or event is to be proved by means of a document or
other recording, the ‘‘original’’ of such document or
recording must be used. 7 The electronic record provisions of the Evidence Acts state that electronic records
satisfy the best evidence rule on proof of ‘‘the integrity of
the electronic records system in which the electronic
record was recorded or stored’’, referred to as the electronic record ‘‘system integrity test’’. 8 Therefore, in
regard to electronic records, these provisions substantially alter the best evidence rule.
Eight of Canada’s 14 jurisdictions have enacted electronic record provisions that copy the UEEA. 9 New
Brunswick added its own unique ‘‘electronic imaging’’
provisions to its Evidence Act in 1996, 10 and Quebec had
the necessary electronic evidentiary provisions in place
in the Civil Code of Quebec 11 before the electronic
record provisions of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA)
became operative on May 1, 2000, being the first to do so
as Part 3 of the federal Personal Information Protection
and Electronic Documents Act (commonly referred to as
PIPEDA). 12 Given that all 14 jurisdictions have enacted
electronic commerce legislation (which, for the common
law jurisdictions, closely copies the ULCC’s Uniform
Electronic Commerce Act (the UECA)), and given that
such UECA legislation needs UEEA legislation with
which to enforce its legal rights and obligations — as all
commerce needs appropriate laws of evidence that facilitate enforcing its laws of commerce — it is surprising
that four jurisdictions have yet to enact UEEA legislation,
namely, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador,
Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories. The answer
from those four jurisdictions must be that the business
record provisions of their Evidence Acts can continue to
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serve electronic records adequately, just as they have
until now.
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Even if such an argument were valid, which it is not,
it will lead to an unsatisfactory state of the law, which is
described below under the heading, ‘‘9. Contradictory
Caselaw — Civil Versus Criminal Proceedings’’. Any
argument that the business record provisions can adequately serve electronic records is defeated by the very
existence of the electronic record provisions, which were
enacted because of the serious doubts that the business
record provisions could adequately serve that purpose. 13
There are advantages brought to the law by those newer
provisions — as analyzed below, which cannot be found
in the older business record provisions.
Although there are few available decisions that have
interpreted these new electronic record provisions —
and none that have added significantly to what these
provisions state themselves 14 — there are many older
decisions that deal with best evidence rule issues. In
particular, the decisions in R. v. McMullen 15 and R. v.
Bell and Bruce, 16 although banking record cases rather
than business record cases, do deal with the best evidence rule issues within subsection 29(2) of the CEA.
Therefore, until newer decisions displace them, they are
very useful in dealing with issues arising from the electronic record provisions.
The argument that the second of these two decisions overrules the first is not valid, nor is the argument
that the Ontario Court of Appeal has limited McMullen
to its own peculiar facts. 17 Firstly, until a court expressly
states that one of its earlier decisions is overruled, an
opinion that the earlier decision has ‘‘effectively been
overruled’’ is of dubious value. Secondly, this argument is
based on the statement in Bell and Bruce that, ‘‘The
authenticity of the record as evidence is sufficiently guaranteed by compliance with subsection 2 of section 29’’. 18
The word ‘‘authenticity’’ is a reference to the authentication rule, not to the best evidence rule issues within
subsection 29(2) of the CEA. Thirdly, the system integrity test of the new electronic record provisions requires
what McMullen requires. 19

3. The ‘‘System Integrity Test’’ in
Comparison with Hearsay Rule
Issues

A

ll legal issues concerning the use of business records
as evidence fall into three categories: hearsay issues,
best evidence rule issues, and authentication issues.
Hearsay issues concern the truth of the contents of a
record. The best evidence rule concerns the reliability of
copies, duplicates, and other substitutes for an original
record — for example, is a particular printout a reliable
reproduction of its electronic source? Authentication
concerns the authorship of a record and the authority to
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issue it as an official record. The electronic record provisions of the Evidence Acts, 20 provide the test for satisfying a challenge under the best evidence rule, i.e., is the
paper printout or other display a reliable reproduction of
its electronic source? They state that the best evidence
rule in respect of an electronic record is satisfied by proof
of the integrity of the electronic records system by or in
which the record was recorded or stored. If a record is
also challenged under the hearsay rule, its admissibility
will be tested as well under the business record, banking
record, microfilm record, government record, or other
record or document provisions. 21
Therefore, the law governing the use of records as
evidence in legal proceedings is no longer dependent
upon the preservation of ‘‘original’’ paper documents. In
satisfaction of the best evidence rule, electronic records
are now admissible as evidence dependent upon ‘‘the
integrity of the electronic records system in which they
are recorded or stored’’. 22
However, that integrity is not defined by the Evidence Acts. It is left to the courts and tribunals to determine whether an electronic records system from which
an electronic record comes has that necessary integrity
and to devise their own tests for doing so. As a result, the
amendments added to the Evidence Acts to accommodate electronic records are a compromise between the
desire for certainty in the test to be applied and flexibility in applying it. The wording of the business record
provisions reflects that same legislative drafting
strategy. 23
Although there is no exact, mandatory definition of
‘‘integrity’’ provided to elucidate the system integrity test,
the following ‘‘presumptions of integrity’’ are provided. 24
‘‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary’’, the integrity
of an electronic records system by or in which an electronic record is recorded or stored is proved:
(a) by evidence capable of supporting a finding that at all
material times the computer system was operating
properly or, if it was not, the fact of its not operating
properly did not affect the integrity of the electronic
record and there are no other reasonable grounds to
doubt the integrity of the electronic records system;
(b) by whether it is established that the electronic record
was recorded or stored by a party who is adverse in
interest to the party seeking to introduce it; or
(c) by whether it is established that the electronic record
was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course
of business by a person who is not a party to the
proceedings and who did not record or store it under
the control of the party seeking to introduce it.

The phrase ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’
in (c) is also undefined. This very same phrase provides
the key test for admissible records in the ‘‘business
record’’ provisions, wherein it is also undefined. 25

McMullen can be used to argue what standard of
electronic RIM should be required by the system integrity test. It imposed the following necessary, but since
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ignored, ‘‘ McMullen standard’’. Morden J.A., delivering
the judgment of the Court, stated:
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I accept that the demonstration of reliability of computer evidence is a more complex process than proving the
reliability of written records. I further accept that as a matter
of principle a Court should carefully scrutinize the foundation put before it to support a finding of reliability, as a
condition of admissibility (see McCormick’s Handbook on
the Law of Evidence, 2nd ed. (1972), p. 734), and that the
admission procedures in s. 30 [CEA] are more fine-tuned
than that in s. 29 [CEA]. However, this does not mean that
s. 29(2) is not adequate to the task. The four conditions
precedent provided for therein, the last one being that the
copy of the entry offered in evidence is a true copy of what
is in the record, have to be proved to the satisfaction of the
judge. The nature and quality of the evidence put before the
Court has to reflect the facts of the complete record keeping
process — in the case of computer records, the procedures
and processes relating to the input of entries, storage of
information, and its retrieval and presentation: see Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib (1965), 132 N.W. 2d 871; King v.
State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp. (1969), 222 So. 2d
393, and ‘‘Note, Evidentiary Problems and Computer
Records’’, 5 Rut. J. Comp. L. 342 (1976), p. 355, et seq. If such
evidence be beyond the ken of the manager, accountant or
the officer responsible for the records (R. v. McGrayne,
Ontario Court of Appeal, March 14, 1979 [since reported
46 C.C.C. (2d) 63]) than a failure to comply with s. 29(2)
must result and the print-out evidence would be inadmissible.
Accordingly, I do not think that the difference in the
procedures between ss. 30 and 29 is such as to compel the
conclusion that s. 29 cannot be applicable to computer
evidence, nor do I think that the potential difficulties of
satisfying s. 29(2) should result in this conclusion. Further, it
may be noted that, at least ostensibly, ss. 29 and 30 do not
operate on the same plane. Section 29 makes the copy
‘‘ prima facie proof’’ while s. 30 makes the record ‘‘admissible
in evidence’’. 26

The important conclusion to draw from this passage
is that if electronically produced banking records require
‘‘proof of the entire record keeping process . . . etc.’’, in
order to gain admissibility under section 29 of the CEA,
then that at the least should be required of electronically
produced business records under sections 30 and 31.1 to
31.8 of the CEA, given that, (1) banks operate under a
much more demanding regulatory regime than does
business in general, and (2) both subsections 29(2) and
30(1) of the CEA use the key phrase and test, ‘‘the usual
and ordinary course of business’’. McMullen is not
binding on any court’s interpretation of the electronic
record provisions because it predates them by 21 years
(1979 to 2000). But it should be considered as being
persuasive authority in regard to an electronic technology, having no more meaningful differences for the
purposes of legal interpretation than its electronic counterparts at the time of McMullen.
Similarly, when such foundation evidence is
adduced by way of an affidavit, as allowed under sections 29(2), 30(6), and 31.6 of the CEA, such affidavits
should also be able to satisfy the above-mentioned
McMullen standard. In fact, being printed forms, such
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affidavits do not contain detail as to ‘‘the complete
record keeping process’’. The foundation evidence
presented is never that thorough, and the witnesses who
adduce such records are seldom cross-examined or otherwise challenged in argument or by opposing witnesses
to that high a standard. And so it is that the caselaw that
should by now have been well developed and refined,
and that should exemplify this landmark decision, does
not exist — not because the courts have chosen to ignore
it, but more likely because counsel appearing before
those courts have ignored it, in both civil and criminal
proceedings. In civil cases the discovery process is used to
make the rules of evidence less important. In criminal
cases — being the much greater source of the rules of
evidence because the greater frequency of jury trials
makes necessary their development — possibly, insufficient knowledge of RIM and of electronic technology
leaves counsel unable to effectively attack business
records. Are civil counsel any more knowledgeable? The
National Standards of Canada, written by experts in the
records and information management industry and cited
herein, can serve to educate and structure one’s crossexamination or examination-in-chief in relation to the
admissibility and weight of business and electronic
records, and in fact, all records used as evidence. 27
Therefore, the above McMullen standard requiring
proof of ‘‘the facts of the complete record keeping process’’ can be said to be very similar to the words, ‘‘proof
of the integrity of the electronic records system in or by
which the data was recorded or stored’’ in subsection 31.2(1) of the CEA and subsection 34.1(5.1) of the
Ontario Evidence Act (OEA). Both are tests of system
integrity. If the McMullen standard had been developed
and regularly applied to produce an ongoing body of
caselaw, the electronic record provisions would not have
been necessary. However, now that they are in existence,
the evidence that their system integrity test should
require should also be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the business record provisions of section 30 of
the CEA and section 35 of the OEA, as well. Can one
possibly prove the system integrity of one’s electronic
records system without also proving consequently, (1) its
‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’, as required by
subsection 30(1) of the CEA and subsection 34.1(5) of
the OEA; and (2) that the ‘‘circumstances of the making
of its records’’ also satisfy subsection 30(6) of the CEA —
and subsection 35(4) of the OEA, as well, albeit this
subsection expressly limits the application of such ‘‘circumstances’’ to issues of ‘‘weight’’?
A contrary argument would be that evidence of
system integrity goes to the issue of whether the record
in question has been altered, accidentally or intentionally, so as to cast doubt on its ‘‘integrity’’, and does not go
to the issue as to whether the record has been created ‘‘in
the usual and ordinary course of business’’ rather than,
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for example, ‘‘in contemplation of litigation’’, or out of
some other potentially corrupting bias or ‘‘oblique
motive’’? 28 That is, system integrity should be limited to
the types of defects within the preview of the best evidence rule (for which the system integrity test was created), and not those that the hearsay rule and its exceptions guard against as well. This restricted, reduced
integrity is used in the electronic commerce legislation
pertaining to the ‘‘legal requirements re original documents’’. 29
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But like the above McMullen standard and accompanying text, words such as ‘‘integrity’’, when applied to
the whole of a record system, have to require foundation
evidence for admissibility that provides a comprehensive
description of the workings of that RIM system. Integrity
has to be comprehensively applied, for it cannot have
validity piecemeal, i.e., a RIM system cannot have selective system integrity, with only some of its parts and
certifications required to satisfy that standard. An understanding of the National Standards of Canada 30 should
therefore be necessary.
As to the effect of Bell and Bruce, 31 it does not
justify limiting the operation of the McMullen standard
to situations wherein the printout is relied upon, independently from the reliability (or integrity) of the electronic record system in which it is recorded or stored.
What Bell and Bruce did at most was to take away the
possible argument, based upon McMullen, that where
the printout remains after its electronic record (its electronic ‘‘parent’’) has been erased, the printout should not
be accepted as evidence because it can no longer be
proved to be a ‘‘true copy’’ of that original electronic
record. Bell and Bruce holds that the printout is nonetheless admissible, regardless the state of its electronic
parent. However, that does not disturb the applicability
of the McMullen standard in determining the admissibility of electronically produced records. In this regard,
the analysis below under the heading ‘‘7. The ‘Relied
Upon Printout’ Provisions’’ sets out the competing arguments in regard to those provisions and gives insight into
the purpose of the electronic record provisions.
However, that purpose has been removed by the
technology those provisions were enacted to serve — a
technology that requires only the hearsay rule and its
business record exception (and other record exceptions)
and not the best evidence rule. McMullen and Bell and
Bruce were decided almost 20 years before the first of
these electronic record provisions came into effect. 32
They and the best evidence rule should no longer be
necessary, being based upon the faulty concept that computer software neatly and clearly separates its issues of
fact and law into hearsay rule and best evidence rule
varieties. In fact, electronic record systems irretrievably
scramble them together. For example, if a software
failure casts doubt upon the truth of the contents of a
printout, does that create a hearsay rule issue or a best
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evidence rule issue? ‘‘Truth of contents’’ issues have long
been established as hearsay rule issues, and thereby provide the conceptual basis and justification for the rule
against hearsay evidence. But the electronic record provisions expressly treat electronic record systems and their
printouts as creating best evidence rule issues. Is the
necessary answer that the hearsay rule applies to the
declarations of human beings and not to those of electronic devices and the record systems that contain them?
If it is not a hearsay rule issue, then what is it? Perhaps,
therefore, is it more correct to consider such as being the
declarations of humans because it is humans who set
such electronic systems in motion to make such declarations? The answer should be, ‘‘why does it matter how
such issues are categorized?’’ The software failure has cast
doubt upon the credibility of the contents of its printout.
Thus, the technology has blurred the distinction
between hearsay rule and best evidence rule issues, if not
completely removed it. Consequently, so should the law.
Nevertheless, the electronic record provisions are now
part of the Evidence Acts of Canada and must be coped
with. However, the business record provisions were left
untouched by such enactments, thus necessitating a
‘‘two-step analysis’’ of the admissibility issues for electronic records — one step for each set of provisions. The
steps should have been combined into one. They would
be, if judicial interpretation holds that satisfaction of the
system integrity test also satisfies the tests of the business
record provisions.
Nonetheless, the electronic record provisions can
serve important purposes. The more capable electronic
technology becomes, the more complex it becomes.
Standard procedures become more complex and varied,
far different in kind, and not merely in degree, than their
pre-electronic counterparts — not merely in the speed
and volume of intake and output as though electronic
record systems mean nothing more than faster typewriters and adding machines. The McMullen standard is
all the more necessary as that complexity increases, and
the opponent of admissibility consequently becomes less
capable of challenging electronic record systems and
their records. Contrary to this reality, however, the business record provisions set a low threshold of admissibility by way of the weak, subjective test — ‘‘the usual
and ordinary course of business’’ — which is not an
effective burden of proof for RIM ‘‘quality assurance’’. As
a result, an unfair burden of disproving quality assurance
is cast upon the opponent of admissibility. More compatibly with the nature of electronic record systems, the
system integrity test of the electronic record provisions
casts an effective burden of proof upon the proponent of
admissibility. Therefore, the ‘‘circumstances of the
making of the record’’ test should equally be interpreted
as imposing a similar burden of proving quality assurance upon the proponent as a necessary condition-precedent to admissibility for business records under sec-
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tion 30 of the CEA. Although this ‘‘circumstances of the
making’’ test is expressly barred in its provincial Evidence Act counterparts from similar application to issues
of admissibility, 33 their double ‘‘usual and ordinary
course of business’’ tests might be given such application
in regard to electronic records. So far however, the
caselaw has made no distinction between the section 30
(CEA) single ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ test
and the double variety of the provincial and territorial
Evidence Acts. 34 Or, even though expressly barred from
preventing admissibility, such ‘‘circumstances of the
making’’ tests could be held to impose a similar burden
of proving quality assurance as a condition-precedent to
electronic records being given any ‘‘weight’’ as business
records, even if ruled admissible.
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There are, therefore, three important reasons why
satisfying the electronic record provisions with sufficient
evidence should be held to satisfy the business record
provisions, as well: (1) the law reflects the reality that
electronic technology needs no distinction between
hearsay rule and best evidence rule issues; (2) it enables
procedural simplicity, i.e., it is a one-step procedure; and
(3) an effective burden of proof is cast where it should be
— upon the party adducing the records in question.
Quite apart from such caselaw remedies, in comparison with the business record provisions, the electronic
record provisions provide the following improvements
to the evidentiary law of business records:
1. Substitute an evaluation of electronic record
system integrity in place of evaluating paper-original documents as a test for determining the
admissibility of, and ‘‘weight’’ (probative value;
credibility) to be given business records (ss. 31.2
and 31.3 of the CEA; ss. 34.1(5)–(7) of the OEA) if
they subsume the business record provisions,
because satisfying the system integrity test will
satisfy the tests of the business record provisions;
2. Expressly encourage the use of national and
industry standards of record-keeping and information management in the determination of
issues of admissibility and weight (section 31.5 of
the CEA; subsection 34.1(8) of the OEA);
3. Abolish retention periods for paper-original
records as a condition-precedent to the admissibility of their microfilm and imaged counterparts
(the infamous ‘‘six-year rule’’; e.g., subsections 34(3) and (4) of the OEA to be repealed —
but such repeal not being necessary for section 31 of the CEA because it did not contain a
retention period);
4. Give electronic records a legal status equal to that
of paper-originals in regard to the authentication
rule and the best evidence rule (ss. 31.1 and 31.2
of the CEA; ss. 34.1(4), (5), (5.1) of the OEA);

5. Make destruction of paper-originals optional
without impairing the legal status of their electronic record counterparts in relation to admissibility and weight (destruction is assumed to be
optional because the CEA and OEA provisions
are silent on this issue); and
6. Allow recognition of trading partner agreements
for electronic data interchange (EDI) that set up
binding procedural protocols for transmitting all
business records electronically, and for settling
disputes arising from such data interchange
(s. 31.5 of the CEA; s. 34.1(8) of the OEA).
Such improvements could have been built into a
single set of provisions dealing with the admissibility and
weight of electronic records.
As to the hearsay 35 rule issue concerning ‘‘the truth
of the contents of records’’, the Evidence Acts provide
that business records, including government records, are
admissible as evidence if made in the organization’s
‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ (s. 30(1) of the
CEA; and s. 35(2) of the OEA). However, the phrase,
‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ is again undefined. The court or tribunal may have regard to ‘‘the
circumstances of the making of the record’’ in determining what that usual and ordinary course of business
is (s. 30(6) of the CEA and s. 35(4) of the OEA). But there
is no guidance as to the required ‘‘circumstances of the
making of the record’’ — these sections are silent. Nevertheless, these two undefined phrases provide the tests
that determine whether any particular record is acceptable as evidence. Paper records that have never been kept
in electronic form are subject to these ‘‘business record’’
provisions alone. 36 These tests, being undefined, make it
important to use national and industry standards such as
the National Standards of Canada, Electronic Records as
Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005, and
Microfilm and Electronic Images as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.11-2000, to give them a RIM context for definition, policy, and procedure.
The lack of adequate caselaw for the business record
provisions after 40 years in operation suggests a lack of
awareness of the fundamental differences between electronic and traditional (paper) records management systems. Electronic and paper record systems make necessary a fundamental difference in the concepts upon
which each is admitted into evidence — the difference
between ‘‘electronic records system integrity’’, and the
traditional and much older ‘‘proof of the original record’’
made, ‘‘in the usual and ordinary course of business’’. Is
there too often a willingness by counsel to accept each
other’s records into evidence on consent? Such practice
does not warrant a presumption as to the high degree of
accuracy, reliability, and trustworthiness of such records.
If it is due to a failure of knowledge and investigation of
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electronic records system management and practice, the
result will become more potentially damaging to one’s
case as electronic technology increases in capability and
complexity and all business activity becomes completely
dependent upon it. Counsel is somewhat at risk when
using the business record provisions without knowing
something of RIM policy and procedure, and now even
more so when having to cope with the electronic record
provisions.

4. The Adequacy of the Business
Record Provisions
(a) The hearsay and best evidence rules
remain separate rules
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T

he Evidence Acts that have incorporated the UEEA
do not deal with hearsay rule issues because the
UEEA is based upon the assumption that the distinction
between paper and electronic records concerns form but
not substance. This assumption means that distinctions
among the media of storage — whether they be paper,
electronic, or optical media — do not affect the truth of
the contents of records. Therefore the hearsay rule, being
a rule concerning ‘‘truth of contents’’, is not dealt with by
the UEEA because of the mistaken belief that the hearsay
rule is ‘‘doing fine’’ in relation to records. Rules as to
authentication and best evidence concern matters of
authorship, form, and content, other than the truth of
their contents. Therefore, they are the substance of the
UEEA.
This distinction between form and substance and
between form and truth of contents, can be challenged
as being overly simplistic. The assumption that the distinction between paper and electronic records affects the
form but not the substance (i.e., the truth of contents) of
records is wrong. For example, imaged records involve
matters that affect the truth of contents as well as the
form of records. 37 Similar arguments can be made as to
other forms of electronic records. The distinction
between paper and electronic records concerns all matters of content as well as form. The distinction between
form and content, between medium of storage and the
truth of contents, was valid before there were electronically created and stored business records — that is to say,
when all records were traditional paper-original records.
But now electronic technology has blurred these distinctions such that trying to separate form from substance,
and medium of storage from the truth of contents is
illusory and serves no meaningful purpose in law. Similarly, the conceptual distinctions between the hearsay
rule and the best evidence rule are obsolete. The UEEA
perpetuates such conceptual ‘‘distinctions without a difference’’.
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The major shortcomings of the law of business
records concern the hearsay rule — that is, the conditions under which a record will be accepted or not
accepted in proof of the truth of its contents. Those
conditions are the recording of acts and events in permanent records by means of original entries made close to
the time when they happen, in the routine of business,
and recorded by persons that have direct, personal
knowledge of those acts and events, and who are under a
‘‘business duty’’ to make such records with no motive to
misrepresent. 38 These requirements provide the foundation for the legal concept of the ‘‘original’’. Proof of those
business acts and events is to be made by means of that
‘‘original’’ permanent record. This traditional rule is
therefore based upon the medium of storage, the original
permanent paper record. Although it is being used now
to admit electronic records into evidence, it is law based
upon pre-computer concepts of record-keeping. Therefore, it is neither free from doubt, nor from important
undecided issues.
In contrast, computer systems often use many
storage media for each record. The final or permanent
medium of storage is, more often than not, not the original medium upon which records were recorded. Nor
are such permanent records made close to the time of
the acts and events so recorded, nor made by the person
having direct personal knowledge of the acts and events
so recorded. Therefore, the integrity of electronically produced and stored business records should be made
dependent upon proof of ‘‘record system integrity’’, not
proof of original paper records. The law has to reflect this
same transition in concept that business RIM has made.
That is why the UEEA should have dealt with the
hearsay rule, so as to make that legal transformation.

(b) The weaknesses and inadequately
answered issues of the business record
provisions
As a result, the most serious failings of the present
business record provisions in the Evidence Acts remain
unchanged. They are:
(1) they fail to inform adequately as to what evidence is needed for proof of the truth of business records sufficient to render them admissible in evidence and
(2) they allow court decisions to ride off in all directions because the tests they provide are undefined and too vague to command consistency in
judicial interpretation. 39
In short, the current law as to the admissibility and
weight of business records is based upon three concepts,
two of which are without fixed definition and the third
of which needs to be revised for electronic records. The
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two undefined concepts are, ‘‘the usual and ordinary
course of business’’, and ‘‘the circumstances of the
making of the record’’. They appear in most of the evidence legislation in Canada. 40 The third is the concept of
the ‘‘original’’ record. 41
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The absence of fixed definitions of the key phrases
‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ and ‘‘the circumstances of the making of the record’’ gives the courts
complete flexibility in applying them. But that same flexibility leaves litigants and the business community
uncertain as to what is required to prove business
records as admissible and credible evidence. To aggravate this unsatisfactory situation, several important
hearsay rule questions about business records as evidence remain unanswered, even with the combined
assistance of statutory business record provisions and
court decisions interpreting them. Consider the following examples of important questions needing
answers, or new answers, and the conflicting answers
given by the court decisions cited in their accompanying
notes:
Whether the present statutory language requires that
admissible records need only be made by a person under a
‘‘business duty’’ to make such records, or whether the supplier of the information recorded, as well as the maker of
the record must have been acting pursuant to such ‘‘business duties’’. 42 For example, a customer using an ATM is not
under a business duty to the bank but bank records are thus
made by that customer and relied upon by the bank.
Whether s. 30(1) CEA allows for double hearsay and
not just single hearsay. Such limitation would arise from the
opening words, ‘‘Where oral evidence in respect of a matter
would be admissible . . . ’’. 43
Whether it is sufficient if the making of the record was
part of the ordinary routine of the business, or whether not
only the making of the record but also the events being
recorded must be part of the business routine. 44 For
example, making an accident report is business routine, but
the accident is not, unless one’s business is accidents.
Whether contemporaneity (co-incidence in time)
between the making of a record and the events recorded as
part of the ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ must
always be required, or at least considered. 45
Whether records are inadmissible because of the
interest or bias of the maker of the records, or whether such
a requirement is not to be read into the business record
provisions of our Evidence Acts, and is merely to be considered as going to the ‘‘weight’’ of the record if admitted into
evidence. 46
Whether admissibility requires detailed evidence of the
RIM system, or merely an examination of the system by an
expert witness of the proponent of the records in question. 47
Whether business records may contain statements of
opinion. 48

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that a computer printout can be treated as an ‘‘original’’ business
record even if its electronic source has been deleted.
Previously, the hard copy printout was held to be merely
a copy dependent upon the continued existence of its
electronic counterpart for purposes of an authenticating
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comparison if called for. 49 Should electronic records
have the same legal status as their paper originals if those
originals are no longer available to verify the accuracy of
those electronic descendants, and should printouts have
the legal status of their electronic ancestors or parents
after they have been deleted from their hard drives?
(Subsection 4(2) of the UEEA deals with this issue, but in
relation to the best evidence rule, not the hearsay rule.
Software now affects all three rules of admissibility
‘‘seamlessly’’ (the hearsay, best evidence, and authentication rules) and therefore so should the legal rule determining the admissibility of the products of the application of such software in making and storing electronic
records.)
Such unanswered ‘‘hearsay’’ questions could be
resolved by statute to allow the business record provisions to be compatible with electronic business
records. 50 Instead, the UEEA perpetuates the best evidence rule where it is no longer needed.

(c) The future of the concept of the
‘‘original’’ record
The third unsatisfactory concept in the present law
is that of ‘‘the original’’, i.e., proof of a record requires
proof of the original record. It is not unsatisfactory
because it remains vague and undefined, but rather
because it is incompatible with electronic RIM which
has no such ‘‘original’’. An acceptable original in its precomputer form, is one made at or near the time of the
events it records — such is the ‘‘contemporaneity’’
requirement. This concept of the ‘‘original’’ concerns the
best evidence rule rather than the hearsay rule, as did the
previous two concepts of ‘‘the usual and ordinary course
of business’’ and ‘‘the circumstances of the making of the
record’’. The relative simplicity and clarity of the ‘‘original’’ provides some compensation for the vagueness of
the other two concepts. The best evidence rule states that
the absence or alteration of the original must be adequately explained or proof of its admissibility will fail. 51
An important consequence of moving the law from
‘‘original’’ to ‘‘system integrity’’, that is, from a dependence upon proof of the integrity of the original business
document, to a dependence upon proof of the integrity
of the RIM system, means that the best evidence rule
loses most or all of its meaning and purpose. That is so
because the same factors that are relevant to applying the
hearsay rule exception for business records will also
affect the use of the evidence as equivalent to an original,
which is a best evidence rule issue. Because the UEEA
directs an analysis of such system integrity for purposes
of the best evidence rule, and electronically produced
records are system-dependent for their integrity in regard
to the hearsay rule as well, the UEEA should have so
dealt with the hearsay rule instead of leaving the existing
inadequate statutory law in place. Electronic technology
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blurs the distinction between form and content and,
therefore, between the hearsay rule and the best evidence rule. The UEEA attempts to preserve pre-computer concepts for the mere sake of legal continuity from
past to present even though those concepts, as separate
concepts, are now obsolete. They need unification into
one principle of system integrity because electronic RIM
systems and electronic technology as a whole, in fact,
deal with the form and substance of business records as a
seamless whole. The alternative choices for such reform
have been reviewed in the consultation papers of the
ULCC. 52 The result of those papers and their subsequent
consultation process has been the UEEA and its incorporation into a majority of the Evidence Acts in Canada,
(beginning with the amendments to the CEA, sections 31.1–31.8, operative from May 1, 2000).
As to the hearsay issue concerning the truth of the
contents of records, the Evidence Acts provide that ‘‘business records’’, which includes government records, are
admissible as evidence if made in the organization’s
‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’. 53 However, the
phrase ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ is again
undefined. But under subsection 30(6) of the CEA, the
court or tribunal may have regard to ‘‘the circumstances
of the making of the record’’ in determining whether to
accept any record as evidence. And to that end, under
subsection 30(9) of the CEA:
Any person, who has or may reasonably be expected to
have knowledge of the making or contents of any record
produced or received in evidence under this section may,
with leave of the court, be examined or cross-examined
thereon by any party to the legal proceeding. 54

However, in contrast to subsection 30(6) of the CEA,
subsection 35(4) of the OEA and subsection 42(3) of the
BCEA limit the use of such ‘‘circumstances’’ to issues of
‘‘weight’’:
The circumstances of the making of such a writing or
record, including lack of personal knowledge by the maker,
may be shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances
do not affect its admissibility. 55

(d) The two hearsay admissibility tests in
section 30 of the CEA — which is predominant?
Of great importance to the nature of the foundation
evidence adduced to gain or oppose admissibility of
both electronic and traditional paper-original records, is
the strong argument that subsection 30(6) of the CEA is
the predominant test of section 30, rather than the
‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ test of subsection 30(1) of the CEA. Subsection 30(6) makes ‘‘the circumstances of the making of a record’’ applicable to
both the admissibility of and ‘‘weight’’ given any business record. Such interpretation means that subsection 30(6) is not only an exclusionary rule, but is also
superior to the admissibility test in subsection 30(1) provided by the words, ‘‘a record made in the usual and

ordinary course of business’’. If so, any ‘‘circumstances of
the making of a record’’ could be used alone or with
others to determine whether any business record should
be excluded, whether or not it was made within ‘‘the
usual and ordinary course of business’’ of the organization from which the record was produced and is being
adduced. A very detailed cross-examination of the chief
records officer, or other proponent witness of admissibility, as to such ‘‘circumstances of the making’’ should
therefore be imperative. Note that this interpretation
views subsection 30(6) as an exclusionary rule only, and
not as a rule for admitting as well as excluding records
from evidence.
Support for this ‘‘predominance view’’ of subsection 30(6) over subsection 30(1) of the CEA can be found
in J. Douglas Ewart, Documentary Evidence in Canada. 56
At page 85, footnote 57, the author states:
Subs. 30(6), Canada Evidence Act, supra, note 7. The
argument that this subsection creates an exclusionary
power, rather than just a power to assess the weight of any
particular record, is grounded on the opening words. It
seems clear that the words: ‘‘For the purpose of determining
whether any provision of this section applies’’ include subs.
(1), which is the foundation of admissibility. The court
should, therefore, be able to use the subs. (6) powers to
determine whether to apply subs. (1), or in other words, to
determine whether or not to admit the record. This interpretation is buttressed by the next following phrase in subs.
(6): ‘‘ or for the purpose of determining the probative value, if
any . . .’’. The use of the disjunctive implies that the opening
phrase relates to admissibility, rather than just weight.
Although it could be argued that the subs. (6) examination
is limited to determining whether the document is
authentic and was made in the usual and ordinary course of
business, it would appear to be open to the courts to take
the broader view that the subsection permits them to decide
whether subs. (1)’s admissibility power ought to be used. If
this expanded view does not prevail and all documents
which are found, on a subs. (1) examination, to have been
made in the usual and ordinary course of business and to
concern matters respecting which oral evidence would be
admissible, must be admitted, then it is clear that the court
can give them no weight at all. See note 58, infra. [emphasis
in original]

The body of the text containing the references to footnotes 57 and 58 appears under the heading, ‘‘Changes
from the Common Law Admissibility Tests: An Overview [of s. 30 CEA]’’. It states: 57
Also gone is any rigid standard of contemporaneousness. However, departure from this common law standard,
and indeed all others, forms a valid basis for an argument
that the court should use its apparent power to exclude the
record [fn. 57] or at least, pursuant to its undisputed
authority to do so, should give the document little weight.
[fn. 58]

Footnote 58 itself states:
This approach was adopted by Callaghan Co. Ct. J. (as
he then was) in R. v. Grimba (1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 469
(Ont. Co. Ct.) at 472: ‘‘These are matters which, of course,
would go the weight of the documents and matters which
should be drawn to the attention of the jury’’. The continuing applicability of the common law where matters of
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weight are in issue was forcefully stated by Morand J. in
Aynsley v. Toronto Gen. Hospital, supra, note 8. 58

And as well, at page 99:
Then there is the general power in section 30(6) to
consider the record and the circumstances of its making in
deciding its admissibility and weight.

Whereas ‘‘the usual and ordinary course of business’’ is a subjective test, being determined by the nature
of the course of business of the business organization
itself, 59 ‘‘the circumstances of the making of the record’’
invites the application of objective and authoritative
standards of RIM. Thus National Standards of Canada
approved by the Standards Council of Canada 60 concerning RIM become applicable in determining the
admissibility and weight of business records, under both
the business records hearsay rule exceptions in the Evidence Acts, and the common law exception as well. The
latter uses a comparable phrase, ‘‘in the routine of business’’, which equally invites the application of objective
and authoritative standards. 61
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(e) The business records exception to the
hearsay rule at common law compared
with its Evidence Act counterparts
Both a statutory and common law business records
exception to the hearsay rule are available in 12 of
Canada’s 14 jurisdictions. They have different constituent elements, which gives a reason for using them
together in any legal proceeding wherein there is a statutory business records exception available. All provincial
and territorial Evidence Acts contain such a provision
except the Evidence Acts of Alberta and Newfoundland
and Labrador. Therefore, in proceedings governed by the
provincially enacted laws of Alberta and Newfoundland
and Labrador, only the business records exception at
common law would be available. However, in proceedings based upon federal statutes, the business records
exception within section 30 of the CEA would apply and
could be relied upon, along with the exception at
common law. The common law business records exception was redefined and updated by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Ares v. Venner. 62 Although a full understanding of the operation of the common law exception
requires a thorough examination of the ‘‘ Ares v. Venner
progeny’’ (all of the subsequent court decisions that have
applied this ruling), the following key passage from Ares
v. Venner itself is sufficient for purposes of this description of the applicable rules of evidence: 63
Hospital records, including nurses’ notes, made contemporaneously by someone having a personal knowledge
of the matter then being recorded and under a duty to
make the entry or record, should be received in evidence as
prima facie proof of the facts stated therein. This should, in
no way, preclude a party wishing to challenge the accuracy
of the records or entries from doing so. Had the respondent
here wanted to challenge the accuracy of the nurses’ notes,
the nurses were present in Court and were available to be
called as witnesses.
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The Supreme Court of Canada decided that hospital
records were admissible in a medical malpractice case,
the Court stating that judges could restate common law
hearsay exceptions to meet modern conditions — a proposition rejected by the House of Lords in England a few
years earlier in a decision also turning upon the business
records exception at common law: Myers v. D.P.P. 64 The
result of the decision in Ares, as shown by subsequent
decisions, has been to expand the scope of admissibility
of the business records exception to the rule against
hearsay evidence at common law, for all business
records. 65
Ewart concludes his analysis of the effect of Ares
upon the common law exception by listing its resulting
constituent elements as they stand now, as follows: 66
In the result, the modern rule can be said to make
admissible a record containing (i) an original entry (ii) made
contemporaneously (iii) in the routine (iv) of business (v) by
a recorder with personal knowledge of the thing recorded as
a result of having done or observed or formulated it (vi) who
has a duty to make the record and (vii) who had no motive
to misrepresent. Read in this way, the rule after Ares does
reflect a more modern, realistic approach for the common
law to take towards business duty records.

As Ewart states, the most dramatic change made by
section 30 of the CEA is that it has only two requirements of admissibility, but the common law exception
still has as many as seven elements. 67 Subject to what is
set out above as to the ‘‘predominance view’’ of subsection 30(6) over subsection 30(1) of the CEA, ‘‘[u]nder
section 30, a record prima facie qualifies for admission if:
(i) it was made in the usual and ordinary course of
business; and (ii) it refers to a matter in respect of which
oral evidence would be admissible’’. 68 This second
requirement arises from the opening words of subsection 30(1) of the CEA: ‘‘Where oral evidence in respect of
a matter would be admissible in a legal proceeding’’,
which words are immediately followed by the first
requirement, ‘‘a record made in the usual and ordinary
course of business that contains information in respect of
that matter is admissible in evidence under this section
in the legal proceeding on production of the record’’. 69
Paper records that have never been kept in electronic form are subject to the statutory and common law
hearsay exceptions alone. The electronic record provisions of the Evidence Acts would not apply to such
records. But electronic records would have to be shown
to be in compliance with them if a best evidence rule
objection were raised.

(f) Divergence of theory and practice
under the business record provisions
The theory of the law’s reliance upon tests of admissibility and weight, such as ‘‘the usual and ordinary
course of business’’ and ‘‘the circumstances of the
making of the record’’, is that it is always within a busi-

151

Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence

✄ REMOVE

Username: shirley.spalding

Date: 27-NOV-07

Time: 17:44

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\06_03\chasse.dat

Seq: 11

ness’s self-interest to maintain complete and accurate
records. The need to maximize profit is assumed to be
an unfailing and constant guarantee of complete and
accurate records and record-keeping systems. But in
many situations now, incomplete and inaccurate records
are necessary to maximize profits, or at least to minimize
losses. For example, there are many more demands for
production of records by private litigants and government departments and regulatory agencies than was the
case when the theory, and the present law it supports,
were created. Often it is more conducive to profit and to
the avoidance of loss to destroy or ‘‘lose’’ embarrassing
and damaging records than to comply with demands for
their production. Official agencies such as environmental, taxing, consumer, labour, and securities authorities have much greater and more frequently used powers
to force production of records and disclosure of information, and to conduct their own searches and seizures
under expanded legal powers.
Similarly, private plaintiffs can use the civil courts to
force production, disclosure, injunctions restraining competitive activities, and to obtain an ‘‘Anton Pillar order’’,
the civil search warrant. That is, a court order is obtained
that requires the defendant to allow a search of its
various premises including searches of its computers
without prior notice and to allow removal of relevant
materials for deposit with the court. The Anton Pillar
order can authorize searches of any premises including
homes, automobiles, and warehouses, and can require
the target persons to disclose the whereabouts of relevant
objects, documents, access procedures, keys, combinations, to allow the taking of photographs and the making
of copies. As well, interlocutory injunctions can be
obtained to restrain further activity in relation to various
products, computers programs, and records facilitating
the business activities being attacked. There now exists
in the civil courts the power to force a business person to
assist in his or her own financial demise by being forced
to disclose one’s very own confidential business information and produce one’s own business records, and to
suffer such at the beginning of such litigation and not
merely as a result of its unfavourable conclusion. As a
result, the increasing benefits of failing to keep such
records and to destroy them if they exist puts self-interest
increasingly in conflict with the legal theory as to what
are legislated and, therefore, officially represented to be
adequate legal tests of the integrity of business records.
The exercise of such powers under the law (such as
the granting of interlocutory injunctions and Anton
Pillar orders) requires proof, and often the source of that
proof is within the records of the defendant who thus
finds his own records used against him. The inducement
to destroy records that might operate against one’s interests grows — profit is no longer the sole dictator of RIM
practice. Destroying or otherwise disposing of one’s damaging records in bad faith (‘‘spoliation’’) is then more in

accord with self-interest than maintaining complete and
accurate records. 70
Therefore, the test of admissibility should judge not
the record alone, but the record system it comes from.
The business record provisions require that the record be
judged. The electronic record provisions require that the
record system be judged. It follows that they should be
combined to create one test that judges the record
system. That can be accomplished by judicial interpretation that holds that evidence that satisfies the system
integrity test of the electronic record provisions, satisfies
the business record provisions, as well. Conversely, evidence that cannot satisfy the system integrity test should
be held to be insufficient to satisfy the business record
provisions. The ‘‘circumstances of the making of the
record’’ test in section 30 of the CEA could be given that
interpretation on the issue of admissibility and on the
issue of weight in the business record provisions of the
provincial and territorial Evidence Acts. Similarly, the
double ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ test of
the latter, 71 could also be given that interpretation on the
issue of admissibility. 72 For both issues, there is no effective way of judging the quality of an electronic record
system, or of any electronic record, except by means of
the system integrity test. The electronic record provisions
confirm and declare that to be so.

5. The Tests Applicable to
Electronic Records as Evidence

T

he tests applicable to the use of electronic records as
evidence in legal proceedings depend upon three
key legal phrases;
(1) ‘‘the integrity of the electronic records system’’
(the ‘‘system integrity test’’);
(2) ‘‘the usual and ordinary course of business’’; and
(3) ‘‘the circumstances of the making of the record’’.
The first phrase is found in the ‘‘electronic record’’ provisions of the Evidence Acts. 73 The second and third are
found in the ‘‘business record’’ provisions. 74 All three
must be satisfied for records that are: (1) recorded or
stored in an electronic record system; and (2) business
records. 75 For records that are ‘‘relied upon printouts’’
within the meaning of subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA,
and subsection 34.1(6) of the OEA, 76 they too will have
to satisfy the business record provisions of the Evidence
Acts. These special subsections might be thought of as
providing a fourth key legal phrase.
For admissibility of a business record that is electronically recorded or stored, one recent decision implies
that the applicable business record provisions are satisfied first, followed by the applicable electronic record
provisions, as well. 77 Quite likely, proof of the ‘‘integrity
of the electronic records system’’ will satisfy the other
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two key phrases as well, because it appears to be a higher
and objective standard, and the ‘‘usual and ordinary
course of business’’ is a lower and subjective standard
and therefore creates a lower ‘‘threshold of admissibility’’. 78 However, the phrase is too new to the Evidence
Acts to tell whether the courts will give it that interpretation. Whereas ‘‘the usual and ordinary course of business’’ is a subjective test, being determined by the nature
of the course of business of the business organization
itself, 79 ‘‘the circumstances of the making of the record’’
test invites the application of objective and authoritative
standards of RIM. Thus, the National Standards of
Canada cited herein 80 should be used when determining
the admissibility and weight of business records, under
both the statutory business records hearsay rule exceptions in the Evidence Acts, and the common law exception, as well. The latter uses a comparable phrase, ‘‘in the
routine of business’’, which equally invites the application of objective and authoritative standards. 81 Given the
all-encompassing definition of ‘‘business’’ used in the Evidence Acts 82 and the pervasiveness now of electronic
RIM, it is best to consider all records as being subject to
the above three legal tests. Being qualitative rather than
quantitative, these tests are not yet capable of an exact
definition or measure. Caselaw applying them has added
little so far. 83
To add further to the distinction between the objective ‘‘system integrity test’’ and the subjective ‘‘usual and
ordinary course of business’’ test, note that the latter
phrase appears in the presumptions created by paragraph 31.3(c) of the CEA and paragraph 34.1(7)(c) of the
OEA, which presumptions are part of the electronic
record provisions of those two Evidence Acts. However,
it does not follow that such appearance in both the
electronic record provisions and in the business record
provisions thereby equates these two sets of provisions as
being equally subjective or objective and having equal
‘‘thresholds of admissibility’’. First, only a rebuttable presumption is created, not an absolute one, as is indicated
by the words ‘‘in the absence of evidence to the contrary’’, which apply to all three presumptions created by
section 31.3 of the CEA and subsection 34.1(7) of the
OEA. In comparison, the definition of ‘‘electronic record
system’’ in subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA and subsection 34.1(5.1) of the OEA, which creates the system integrity test, is not a mere presumption. Second, the ‘‘usual
and ordinary course of business’’ test operates in only
one of three presumptions created by section 31.3 of the
CEA and subsection 34.1(7) of the OEA, and not in all
circumstances involving the application of the electronic
records provisions.
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6. National Standards of Records
and Information Management in
Aid of Admissibility

B

ecause the Evidence Acts purposely leave undefined
the above key phrases in the tests they make applicable to records, they therefore provide that for the purpose of determining under any rule of law whether an
electronic record is admissible as evidence in legal proceedings, evidence may be presented in respect of any
standard, procedure, usage, or practice concerning the
manner in which electronic records are to be recorded
or stored. 84 This ‘‘standards as evidence’’ provision states
(using the OEA version):
34.1. (8) For the purpose of determining under any rule
of law whether an electronic record is admissible, evidence
may be presented in respect of any standard, procedure,
usage or practice on how electronic records are to be
recorded or stored, having regard to the type of business or
endeavour that used, recorded or stored the electronic
record and the nature and purpose of the electronic
record. 85

Therefore, the National Standard of Canada, Electronic
Records As Documentary Evidence , CAN/CGSB
72.34-2005, 86 is particularly useful in providing rules and
procedures for RIM, with which to satisfy the Evidence
Act tests. Those tests, and the national standards created
to facilitate their application, are meant to be applied as
much in business and government activities as in legal
proceedings. RIM systems should therefore be designed,
initiated, and maintained in accordance with that law
and those standards.

7. The ‘‘Relied Upon Printout’’ Provisions

I

n addition to the above methods by which electronic
records can satisfy the best evidence rule, there is the
‘‘relied upon printout’’. It is a printout that ‘‘has been
manifestly or consistently acted on, relied on or used as a
record of the information recorded or stored in the
printout’’. 87 The commentary to the UEEA provision,
subsection 4(2), states:
The purpose of this Act is to provide for rules for electronic records, those produced or stored in a computer or
readable at the time of their use only with the help of a
computer. Many records today are produced using a computer with word-processing software and then printed. The
electronic file is never used again. Business correspondence
is an example. The record ‘‘lives its life’’ on paper, and the
paper is presented in evidence. The reliability of the computer system is not at issue. This subsection allows such a
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record to be treated as a paper record. The paper printout
would be the original for the purposes of the best evidence
rule.

It is suggested that there are two interpretations of the
resulting Evidence Act ‘‘relied upon printout’’ provisions:
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1. The printout is not an electronic record because
it is not used as evidence of what is in the computer and therefore the reliability of the computer that generated it is not in issue; and
2. The printout is an electronic record, and proof of
‘‘reliance’’ upon such printout satisfies the best
evidence rule; however, ‘‘evidence to the contrary’’ concerning the reliability of the computer
would displace the presumption flowing from
such ‘‘business reliance’’. 88
Analysis here gives insight into the essential purpose
of the electronic record provisions as a whole. Note that
subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA contains the phrase, ‘‘in
the absence of evidence to the contrary’’, whereas subsection 34.1(6) of the OEA and subsection 4(2) of the UEEA
do not. 89 The theory of the first interpretation is that
because the record lives the whole of its meaningful life
on paper, the necessary reliability that satisfies the best
evidence rule is to be found in the proof of ‘‘business
reliance’’ upon that printout. But there are several arguments in support of the second interpretation.
Advocates of the first interpretation would point to
the opening words of sunbsection 31.2(2) of the CEA,
‘‘Despite subsection (1)’’, as meaning that the printout is
excepted from the rule in subsection (1), and therefore is
not to be considered an electronic record. The OEA
counterpart is in the opening words of subsection 34.1(5), ‘‘Subject to subsection (6)’’, which subsection provides for the ‘‘relied upon printout’’. But the
definition of ‘‘electronic record’’ in subsection 34.1(1) of
the OEA ends with the words, ‘‘other than a printout
referred to in subsection (6)’’. Its CEA counterpart, which
is the definition of ‘‘electronic document’’ in section 31.8, does not contain a comparable qualification.
Also, subsection 4(2) of the UEEA and subsection 34.1(6) of the OEA do not say that the ‘‘relied upon’’
printout satisfies the best evidence rule, but rather that
such printout ‘‘is the record for the purposes of the best
evidence rule’’. In contrast, subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA
states that such ‘‘relied upon’’ printout ‘‘satisfies the best
evidence rule’’. For subsection 4(2) of the UEEA and
subsection 34.1(6) of the OEA, the relationship between
printouts and electronic data is not relevant, as it is for
subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA. This distinction could
therefore support an argument that subsection 31.2(2) of
the CEA creates an electronic record that can be attacked
by adducing evidence of the unreliability of the electronic record system it came from, whereas subsection 34.1(6) of the OEA does not create an electronic
record that can be so attacked. The CEA provision falls
within the second of the two possible interpretations
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suggested above, but the OEA provision comes within
the first interpretation. It would follow that subsection 34.1(6) of the OEA creates a paper document (as
though it came from a typewriter) and not an electronic
record, but subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA creates an
electronic record. If the OEA paper document is an original, it satisfies the best evidence rule. If it is a copy, its
proponent will have to show why a copy should be
allowed to be used as evidence in place of its absent
original. In contrast, subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA
printout will have to be defended against any attack
upon its electronic source. 90
The second interpretation of the electronic record
provisions as an homogeneous whole has the attractions
of consistency, unity, and simplicity, which makes it
more likely to be accepted, even if ‘‘mistaken’’, according
to the intended interpretation of their drafters. It is the
first interpretation that was intended by those who prepared the UEEA for adoption by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, and its CEA and OEA progeny. 91
There is one case in particular that deals with this
subsection, R. v. Morgan. 92 Those who favour the first
interpretation would argue that the Court in Morgan did
not recognize that subsection 31.2(2) CEA describes a
case wherein the printout is not an electronic record
because it is not used as evidence of what is in the
computer, and therefore does not bring the reliability of
the computer into issue. That analysis of Morgan may
mean (to those who favour the second interpretation)
that the subsection will not be widely understood as
being necessary to an age wherein most documents are
generated from a word-processing program to live their
effective lives on paper only, and not as proof of what
was in the computer during such generation — i.e., if
Morgan is wrong in its treatment of subsection 31.1(2) of
the CEA, many courts will make the same ‘‘mistake’’.
Although legislative history can be used in aid of the
interpretation of statutes, Parliamentary history,
including the intention of those who drafted the statute
in question, cannot. 93 Courts are in no way bound to
find that the Parliament or legislature that enacted the
legislation in question, had the same intention as its
drafters. 94
Those favouring the first interpretation would argue
that the printout reliance exceptions to the electronic
record provisions, taken as a whole, were meant to provide for situations wherein the interpretation of records
and settlement of disputes depends entirely upon the
printout containing such records, as in the case of a
printed contract. In such situations, electronic record
system integrity is not involved. In turn, there is no need
to look for originals or copies and duplicates of such
originals, as the traditional form of the best evidence rule
requires. The best evidence rule is thus entirely dispensed with in regard to such relied upon printouts.
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Similarly, it would be argued that the best evidence
rule does not fit electronically produced records, for
there is no true original. The so-called ‘‘copy’’ produced
from its electronic parent is just as good as that original.
Therefore, the best evidence rule has no appropriate
application between them. But it has a meaningful application between any one record and the record system
that produced it. Therefore the UEEA and the electronic
record provisions of the Evidence Acts that incorporated
the UEEA establish a system integrity test. The best evidence rule is satisfied on proof of the integrity of the
electronic record system in which the data was recorded
or stored. 95 This is a substantial alteration of the best
evidence rule in order to make it applicable to electronic
records.
The contrary argument would be that there is in
fact a need for a test linking each printout with its electronic parent. 96 Software and hardware do fail, casting
doubt on the integrity of the resulting printout or other
output from its electronic data or parent. Therefore, all of
the electronic record provisions should be interpreted
with regard to that critical link — the ‘‘lifeline of record
integrity’’.
Does whichever interpretation is adopted make a
difference? — only in so far as it makes the reliability of
the electronic record system that generated the printout
a relevant issue, and thus provides a way of countering
the ‘‘relied upon printout’’ method of satisfying objections based upon the best evidence rule. Even the electronic records of small businesses should have to live
with that.
Ironically, Ewart, 97 writing in 1984 — and therefore
long before the electronic record provisions began to be
added to the Evidence Acts, beginning May 1, 2000 —
used the same distinction between the ‘‘relied upon
printout’’ and the printout that is looked upon as a copy
of a record kept within the computer system, to distinguish the two most important decisions of the Ontario
Court of Appeal as to the test for the admissibility of
computer printouts under the business records provisions of the Evidence Acts. 98

8. Electronic Signatures

G

overnment agencies may soon adopt electronic signature technology allowing for electronic records
and documents to be transmitted with secure electronic
signatures. Therefore, in addition to all the above parts of
the ‘‘electronic record’’ provisions, section 31.4 of the
CEA provides for the making of regulations establishing
presumptions of evidence in relation to electronic documents signed with secure electronic signatures,
‘‘including regulations respecting (a) the association of
secure electronic signatures with persons; and (b) the
integrity of information contained in electronic docu-
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ments signed with secure electronic signatures’’. Secure
electronic signature regulations 99 were published in
Part II of the Canada Gazette for February 23, 2005. 100
These regulations define the technology and the necessary technical terms. They create a presumption as to
authenticating an electronic document, which states:
5. When the technology or process set out in section 2 is used in respect of data contained in an electronic
document, that data is presumed, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, to have been signed by the person who is
identified in, or can be identified through, the digital signature certificate.

As allowed by section 31.4 of the CEA, future regulations could also establish evidentiary presumptions as
to the integrity of information contained in electronic
documents and not only as to their authentication. The
OEA, however, does not yet deal with electronic signatures. But Ontario’s Electronic Commerce Act, 2000,
contains provisions for the use of electronic signatures in
facilitating electronic commerce, (1) section 11 — in
place of signatures, endorsements, and seals; and (2) section 17 — in place of signatures, ‘‘to be provided to a
public body’’. 101

9. Contradictory Caselaw — Civil
Versus Criminal Proceedings

A

n unsatisfactory state of the law now exists because
not all jurisdictions in Canada have enacted electronic record provisions. 102 Caselaw conflicts seem inevitable. In criminal proceedings in all jurisdictions of
Canada, electronic records will be treated as giving rise
to a best evidence rule issue that defines printouts as
copies of their electronic parents, and a hearsay issue as
to the accuracy of what is stated in the printout, because
both the electronic record and business record provisions of the CEA must be satisfied to gain admissibility.
But in civil proceedings in those four jurisdictions that
do not yet have electronic record provisions in their
Evidence Acts, they will be treated as giving rise to a
hearsay issue alone. Before the electronic record provisions were enacted both issues were treated as giving rise
to a single hearsay issue to be determined under the
business record provisions of the applicable Evidence Act
or under the common law business record exception to
the hearsay rule. 103 That will be the first source of conflicting caselaw — the categorizing of the issues of admissibility.
The second source is the difference in the legal tests
applicable to determine admissibility. The business
record provisions use the key phrases, ‘‘the usual and
ordinary course of business’’ and ‘‘the circumstances of
the making of the record’’. The electronic record provisions use a ‘‘system integrity test’’, as stated in the key
phrase, ‘‘the integrity of the electronic record system in
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which the record is recorded or stored’’. Thus, the electronic record provisions set a much more demanding
standard than do the business record provisions. As
described above, it is an objective standard whose interpretation is guided by National Standards of Canada,
particularly Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence. It requires an assessment of the worth (‘‘integrity’’)
of the whole record system from which the electronic
record in question comes. In contrast, the business
record provisions set a much lower threshold of admissibility in that they require merely proof that the record in
question was made in accordance with whatever is the
authenticating organization’s ‘‘usual and ordinary course
of business’’. This is a very subjective test that does not
require an assessment of the whole record system. As a
result, cases wherein an electronic record provision is
applicable should be much more demanding of the
record system involved than cases wherein a business
record provision alone is applicable. A caselaw conflict as
to the threshold of admissibility is to be expected.
There are, however, two legal arguments that may
diminish these conflicts. Firstly, in criminal proceedings,
subsection 30(6) of the CEA can be argued to require an
examination of the record system from which the record
comes, for it allows ‘‘the circumstances of the making of
the record to be examined’’. It connects such words to its
opening phrase, ‘‘For the purpose of determining
whether any provision of this section applies’’. This supports an argument that subsection 30(6) not only creates
an exclusionary power, but also that it is superior to
subsection 30(1) which contains the admissibility test, ‘‘a
record made in the usual and ordinary course of business’’. This construction would allow any particular ‘‘circumstance of the making of a record’’ to be grounds for
excluding a record, even though it was proved to have
been made ‘‘in the usual and ordinary course of business’’. This argument was well put by J. Douglas Ewart
more than 20 years ago. 104
The argument that this subsection creates an exclusionary power, rather than just a power to assess the
weight of any particular record, is grounded on the
opening words. It seems clear that the words, ‘‘For the
purpose of determining whether any provision of this
section applies’’ include subsection (1), which is the foundation of admissibility. The court should, therefore, be
able to use the subsection (6) powers to determine
whether to apply subsection (1), or in other words, to
determine whether to admit the record. This interpretation is buttressed by the next following phrase in subsection (6), ‘‘ or for the purpose of determining the probative
value, if any. . .’’. The use of the disjunctive implies that
the opening phrase relates to admissibility, rather than
just to weight. Although it could be argued that the
subsection (6) examination is limited to determining
whether the document is authentic and was made in the
usual and ordinary course of business, it would appear to

be open to the courts to take the broader view that the
subsection permits them to decide whether subsection (1)’s admissibility power ought to be used. If this
expanded view does not prevail and all documents
which are found, on a subsection (1) examination, to
have been made in the usual and ordinary course of
business and to concern matters respecting which oral
evidence would be admissible must be admitted, then it
is clear that the court can give them no weight at all.
Secondly, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Starr 105 has held that hearsay evidence that cannot meet
the ‘‘necessity’’ and ‘‘reliability’’ tests of the ‘‘principled
approach to the admissibility of hearsay evidence’’ must
be excluded, even though such hearsay comes within an
established exception to the hearsay rule. And conversely, it can be admitted if it satisfies those tests, even
though it does not come within an established exception. The ‘‘reliability’’ test can be argued to require an
examination of the record system that generated the
record. Although the analysis in Starr concerned the
‘‘traditional exceptions’’ to the hearsay rule and not statutory exceptions such as the business record provisions of
the Evidence Acts, it can be argued that Starr is equally
applicable to statutory exceptions as well. The majority
judgment of Iacobucci J. contains the following
paragraphs that link the ‘‘principled approach’’ to the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: 106
Why the Exceptions Must be Rationalized
[199] As I have already discussed, a fundamental concern with reliability lies at the heart of the hearsay rule. By
excluding evidence that might produce unfair verdicts, and
by ensuring that litigants will generally have the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, the hearsay rule serves as
a cornerstone of a fair justice system.
[200] In Khan, Smith, and subsequent cases, this Court
allowed the admission of hearsay not fitting within an established exception where it was sufficiently reliable and necessary to address the traditional hearsay dangers. However,
this concern for reliability and necessity should be no less
present when the hearsay is sought to be introduced under
an established exception. This is particularly true in the
criminal context given the ‘‘fundamental principle of justice,
protected by the Charter, that the innocent must not be
convicted’’: R. v. Leipert, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281 at para. 24,
112 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 38 quoted in R. v.
Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at para. 71, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321,
180 D.L.R. (4th) 1. It would compromise trial fairness, and
raise the spectre of wrongful convictions, if the Crown is
allowed to introduce unreliable hearsay against the accused,
regardless of whether it happens to fall within an existing
exception.
[201] In addition to improving trial fairness, bringing
the hearsay exceptions into line with the principled
approach will also improve the intellectual coherence of the
law of hearsay. It would seem anomalous to label an
approach ‘‘principled’’ that applies only to the admission of
evidence, not its exclusion. Rationalizing the hearsay exceptions into the principled approach shows that the former are
simply specific manifestations of general principles, rather
than the isolated ‘‘pigeon-holes’’ referred to in U. (F.J.), supra,
at para. 20.
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The ‘‘principled approach’’ to the hearsay exceptions has
thus been made a constitutional principle of trial fairness. Therefore it is superior to any statutory provision
such as the record and document provisions of the CEA
— being a Charter argument it would be applicable only
in criminal proceedings. 107 It can therefore be used to
request an examination of the reliability of a record, and
therefore of the record system it came from, whether or
not the application of section 30 CEA results in a finding
of that record’s admissibility or inadmissibility.

10. Answering John Gregory’s
Attack

I
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n his very helpful article, ‘‘Canadian Electronic Commerce Legislation’’, 108 John Gregory states under the
heading, ‘‘Electronic Evidence’’, and its subheadings, ‘‘(a)
Principles of Documentary Evidence and Their Reform
(i) Hearsay ’’ (at 329):
. . . However, documentary evidence has at common law
been admitted on the ground that the manner in which it is
created gives a ‘‘circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness’’. 109
Electronic documents may tend to reopen the debate,
however. The impermanence and the malleability of information in electronic form make some electronic records
unreliable. Others are, of course, thoroughly trustworthy,
and technology offer many ways to give different degrees of
assurance to them. It has been argued in Canada that the
combination of electronic records and the restatement of
the law of hearsay makes it necessary to develop new rules
for the admission of such records in their character as
hearsay. If these records are unreliable in different ways,
then their reliability is a hearsay issue in a way it was not
when that law was more bound in categories.
The main proponent of this point of view is Ken
Chasse, who is much published on electronic evidence
issues. 110 He would prefer that the courts examine in detail
the circumstances of the creation and retention of electronic
records. The recommendations of his 1994 paper echo the
procedures of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v.
McMullen. 111 This case has, however, been little followed
since then.
The argument on the other side is twofold. First, the
law does not investigate the actual abilities of the human
beings that keep records, in order to apply the business
records rule. Why should it investigate the inner workings
of a computer? Second, ‘‘[t]he required circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness flows from the presumption that
businesses will create systems which ensure the reliability of
their records. The nature of those systems, whether they
involve computers or human beings, does not affect the
reliability of that presumption’’. 112 (We are not talking here
of records created with the prospect of litigation.)
As noted, the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act tends to
the latter argument, at least in respect of hearsay, rather than
Ken Chasse’s more demanding recommendations. The
debate is a reminder of the difficulty caused by using the
same word ‘‘reliability’’ in several different contexts. It does
not mean the same thing, or involve the same tests, when
we are talking about authentication or best evidence. The
quotation from Douglas Ewart’s book in the preceding para-

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

graph introduces yet another concept, of the reliability of a
presumption (in effect, of reliability)! The Uniform Act tried
to stay away from the word, if not the concept.

In defence, the necessary answers are as follows:
First, it is not entirely correct to say of McMullen that
‘‘This case has, however, been little followed since then’’.
In fact, it has received almost no ‘‘judicial treatment’’ at
all (except in Bell, as described above 113). McMullen has
neither been rejected nor ignored. It has not been cited
because the issue that it deals with has not been submitted for decision. That issue asks: what should the
foundation evidence be for admitting electronic records
into evidence? John Gregory’s statement that McMullen
‘‘has, however, been little followed’’ implies that
McMullen has been rejected. The Ontario Court of
Appeal did not expressly do so, and the Supreme Court
of Canada has neither overruled nor distinguished it.
McMullen is still good authority for the McMullen standard that it promulgates, as elucidated above.
Second, Mr. Gregory asks, ‘‘Why should it [the law]
investigate the inner workings of a computer?’’ The
answer is, because it has to. The type of record system
analysis required for judging the accuracy and reliability
of a record from an electronic record system cannot be
the same as that required for a traditional (pre-computer)
paper record system. The concepts of RIM are very different and therefore the conditions-precedent for admissibility must be different. The law must reflect the
change in technology. Technological changes do not
always require changes in the law, but in this case such is
necessary. For example, traditional paper record systems
gave rise to, and therefore can satisfy, the legal concept of
‘‘an original record’’. But in electronic record systems
there is no such ‘‘original’’. The printout taken to court is
produced at the end of the record system’s functions and
activities, not at the beginning — not at the time of the
acts or events it records, and not by a person having
‘‘direct personal knowledge’’. And the other conditionsprecedent of the traditional admissibility rule have no
electronic counterpart, either. Therefore, a new rule of
admissibility is necessary.
That is why the law should investigate the inner
workings of electronic record systems. Their technology
is completely incompatible with the traditional form of
legal analysis which looks for ‘‘an original record’’ and
demands proof in the continuity of its handling until it
arrives in court as a proposed piece of evidence. This
traditional form of legal analysis reflected a traditional
paper record technology that made no distinction
between ‘‘a record’’ and the medium upon which it is
stored, which was invariably paper or microfilm. To use
‘‘a record’’ meant to use its paper or microfilm manifestation. But for electronic record systems, the distinction
between ‘‘a record’’ and its medium of storage is the
foundational concept of their existence and fundamental
to their methods of operation. So, if there is no ‘‘original
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record’’ to examine, what should the necessary rule of
admissibility require examination of? — the electronic
record system itself, and as a unified whole, because that
is the RIM concept upon which it is based. The
McMullen standard declares it to be so, and so do the
National Standards of Canada concerning electronic
RIM, being standards created by experts in the RIM
industry.
Third, John Gregory’s argument assumes the correctness of the presumption that the profit motive is a
sufficient guarantee of accurate and reliable records. As
argued above, the presumption itself should be questioned.
Fourth, John Gregory’s arguments are based upon
the perpetuation of the best evidence rule into the realm
of electronic record systems, and maintaining the distinction between hearsay rule and best evidence rule issues.

The technology of electronic record systems does not
need it, and in fact, stands in contradiction of it. As
argued above, the best evidence rule should be abolished. There is not only no benefit in the form of ‘‘legal
continuity’’ gained from perpetuating its existence, but
also it is damaging to both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law of evidence, as argued above.
In short, these arguments do not address the fundamental difference between electronic record systems and
traditional paper record systems. As a result, the UEEA
perpetuates old legal concepts into a realm of new RIM
technology. They do not fit and they will not work. The
law has been made unnecessarily complicated, and the
pre-existing problems produced by the business record
provisions of the Evidence Acts have not been fixed. An
opportunity for much-needed law reform has been, if
not completely missed, at the least, inadequately used.
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provisions are section 30 of the CEA, and section 35 of the OEA. The
Evidence Act of Ontario is used herein to exemplify similar provisions in
the Evidence Acts of the other common law jurisdictions in Canada, only
because it is not practical to cite comparable provisions in all of the other
provincial and territorial Evidence Acts, as well as the Articles of Book 7,
‘‘Evidence’’, of the Civil Code of Quebec.
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system by or in which the electronic document was recorded or stored, or
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7
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Supra note 2.

The electronic record provisions of the Evidence Acts are close copies of
the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (the ‘‘UEEA’’), which was adopted by
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (the ‘‘ULCC’’) in 1998. The
UEEA, along with its helpful section-by-section commentary, can be
downloaded from the ULCC Web site at: <http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/
index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1u2>.
The ULCC is made up of representatives of the federal and provincial
governments. Many of these representatives have responsibility for preparing amendments such as incorporating the UEEA into the federal,
provincial, and territorial Evidence Acts and Ordinances. The purpose of
the ULCC is to bring about common legislation on subjects of mutual
federal and provincial interest. The main mechanism used is drafting
model pieces of legislation. Therefore, the UEEA, being such an intended
model Act of draft legislation, has become part of the Evidence Acts and
Ordinances across Canada with little alteration from its present form.
Bill C-6, the Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, and Ontario Bill 11, Red Tape Reducation Act,
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electronic record provisions of their respective Evidence Acts. The ULCC
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similar from one province or territory to the next.
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For example, subsection 35(4) of the OEA, supra note 1, states: ‘‘The
circumstances of the making of such a writing or record, including lack
of personal knowledge by the maker, may be shown to affect its weight,
but such circumstances do not affect its admissibility’’. To similar effect is
subsection 42(3) of the Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124 [BCEA], and
most of the other provincial and territorial Evidence Acts use this same
form for their business record provisions.

34

For example, subsection 35(2) of the OEA, supra note 1, states: ‘‘Any
writing or record made of any act, transaction, occurrence or event is
admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence or event if
made in the usual and ordinary course of any business and if it was in the
usual and ordinary course of such business to make such writing or
record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event or within
a reasonable time thereafter’’. The underlying purpose is to require not
only the making of the record, but also the event so recorded to be
within ‘‘the usual and ordinary course of business’’ of the business in
question. For example, an accident report of a train wreck made by a
railway employee would satisfy the first but not the second requirement
because the railway is not in the business of railway accidents: Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477 (1943), being a case found in most
Canadian evidence textbooks to exemplify the purpose of the double
phrase, which was copied from comparable U.S. legislation. However,
such limitation upon the compass of the double phrase in subsection 35(2) of the OEA was expressly rejected in Setak Computer Services
Corp. v. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd. (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 750,
76 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (Ont. H.C.J.) [Setak, cited to D.L.R.], wherein Griffiths J.
stated (at 650): ‘‘With respect, I believe that Palmer imposes an unreasonable and unnecessary limitation on the wording of the enactment. To
draw a distinction between records relating to the principal business and
those relating only to an auxiliary feature of the business, is not justified
by the plain wording of the section. So long as the records are made in
the usual and ordinary course of some phase of the business, whether
principal or auxiliary, they should be admitted, in my view, according to
the plain meaning of s. 36 [now s. 35]’’. However, Setak did not involve a
‘‘record made in contemplation of litigation’’ as in Palmer v. Hoffman.

35

‘‘Hearsay’’ means a statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted within it, but made otherwise than in testimony at
the proceeding in which it is offered: R. v. O’Brien, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 591,
(1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 209 [O’Brien, cited to S.C.R.] at 593-94.

36

In addition to the ‘‘electronic record’’ and ‘‘business record’’ provisions in
the Evidence Acts, there are also provisions applicable to government
records, to banking records, and to microfilm records. But all are subject
to the provisions concerning electronic records if the records in question
are in electronic form (ss. 31.1 to 31.8 of the CEA, supra note 1; s. 34.1 of
the OEA, supra note 1).

37

11. (1) A requirement under [enacting jurisdiction] law that
requires a person to present or retain a document in original
form is satisfied by the provision or retention of an electronic
document if

Imaging includes microfilmed and scanned records. It includes RIM
procedures such as the use of erasable and non-erasable disks; indexing
and retrieval software quality; preparation of documents for scanning;
scanning resolution; image compression; image enhancement;
encrypting; quality assurance; scanner testing; verification of index data;
backup and recovery procedures; the care, handling, and storage of disks;
hardware and software dependence; security measures; and generally all
of the biographical and bibliographical data (now a variety of ‘‘meta
data’’) which is essential to the use of all business records, both paper and
electronic. Imaging procedures should be guided by the National Standard of Canada, Microfilm and Electronic Images as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.11-1993 (amended to Apr., 2000).

38

(a) there exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the
information contained in the electronic document from the
time the document to be presented or retained was first
made in its final form, whether as a paper document or as
an electronic document;

For an analysis and more exacting statement of the conditions-precedent
to admissibility of business records, both under the business record provisions of the Evidence Acts and at common law, see: Ewart, supra note 13,
at 44–69, and 80–110; Ares v. Venner, supra note 3, and the cases that
have applied it.

39

For example, compare the decisions in such cases as: McMullen, supra
note 15; Bell and Bruce supra note 16; R. v. Vanlerberghe (1976), 6 C.R.
(3d) 222 (B.C.C.A.); Setak, supra note 34; Re Waltson Properties Ltd.
(1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 328 (Ont. Sup. Ct. (Bank. & Ins. Div.)) [Waltson];
Tecoglas Inc. v. Domglas Inc. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 196 at 205 (Ont. H.C.).
Also compare the decisions that have applied to business records the
Supreme Court of Canada’s rewriting of the hearsay rule in Ares v.
Venner, supra note 3, and even more dramatically the Court’s ‘‘principled
exception’’ to the hearsay rule as developed in its celebrated troika of: R.
v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, (1990), 59 C.C.C. (3d) 92; R. v. Smith, [1992]
2 S.C.R. 915, 75 C.C.C. (3d) 257; and R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740,
79 C.C.C. (3d) 257. In 2000, this ‘‘principled approach to the admissibility
of hearsay evidence’’, was made the predominant exception for documentary and record evidence by the S.C.C.’s decision in R. v. Starr, [2000]

Supra note 16, at 380.

19

This comparison is further developed under the next heading — ‘‘3. The
‘System Integrity Test’ in Comparison with Hearsay Rule Issues’’.

20

Supra note 1.

21

For example, there are at least 20 document provisions in the CEA.
Therefore, a notice stating that it is intended to use documentary evidence should not be acceptable if it does not specify which provision(s)
is/are to be used. Each has its own constituent elements and specified
ways of satisfying the hearsay, best evidence, and authentication issues
raised by such intended evidence. A contained statement that it is
intended to adduce documentary evidence pursuant to the Canada Evidence Act is therefore not adequate, even if copies of the documents
accompany the notice.

22

See subsection 31.2(1) of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsection 34.1(5.1)
of the OEA, supra note 1.

23

Given the history of the business record provisions, it is now a strategy of
dubious worth. Many important issues remain to be decided in relation
to these provisions, even though they have been in the Evidence Acts for
more than 40 years — see below, ‘‘4. The Adequacy of the Business
Record Provisions’’.

24

See section 31.3 of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsection 34.1(7) of the
OEA, supra note 1.

25

See subsection 30(1) of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsection 35(2) of the
OEA, supra note 1.

26

[Emphasis added] McMullen, supra, note 15, at 506.

27

National Standards of Canada are written by standards-development
agencies accredited by the Standards Council of Canada (SCC). Draft
standards are submitted to the SCC for its approval, and then published
by the development agency. The function of the SCC is to ensure that
the formal, established process for developing standards has been followed. The national standards cited herein are those of the Canadian
General Standards Board (CGSB), particularly, its newest electronic
records standard, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence — CAN/
CGSB-72.34-2005, and its narrower predecessor, Microfilm and Electronic Images as Documentary Evidence — CAN/CGSB-72.11-1993
(amended to Apr., 2000). See also infra note 86. These standards were
written by committees composed of experts from the records and information management field, including legal advisers. They may be purchased from the CGSB’s Web site: <http://www.ongc-cgsb.gc.ca>.

Seq: 18

Both arguments are made by Ewart, supra note 13, at 134 and 120.

18

28

This contrary argument was put to me by John Gregory, General
Counsel, Policy Division, Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario), and
see also his further contributions infra notes 50, 52, 91, and 108. Given
that the key phrases of the electronic record provisions await judicial
interpretation, just as the key phrases of the business record provisions
still await definitive judicial interpretation, the whole field of possible
interactions between both sets of provisions remains open.

29

The electronic commerce legislation includes section 11 of the UECA,
‘‘Provision of Originals’’, which states (in relevant part):

Date: 27-NOV-07

Time: 17:44

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\06_03\chasse.dat

33

(1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 164, 65 C.C.C. (2d) 377 (Ont. C.A.) [Bell and Bruce,
cited to C.C.C.], aff’d, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 287.

17

(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(a),

Username: shirley.spalding

✄ REMOVE
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(a) the criterion for assessing integrity is whether the information has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the
introduction of any changes that arise in the normal course
of communication, storage and display;
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the
light of the purpose for which the document was made and
in the light of all the circumstances.
30

Supra note 27.

31

Supra note 16.

32

On May 1, 2000, for sections 31.1–31.8 CEA, supra note 1.
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2 S.C.R. 144, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 190 D.L.R. (4th) 591 [Starr]. See infra
note 83, for a more detailed explanation of this point.
40

41

42

✄ REMOVE

Username: shirley.spalding

Date: 27-NOV-07

Time: 17:44

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\06_03\chasse.dat

Seq: 19

43

44

See, for example, subsections 30(1) and (6) of the CEA, supra note 1, and
subsections 35(2) and (4) of the OEA, supra note 1. While these OEA
provisions contain a double ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ test,
the CEA provisions contain a single test, and whereas the CEA makes the
‘‘circumstances of the making of the record’’ relevant to both admissibility and weight, the OEA counterpart in subsection 35(4) expressly
restricts the relevance of such ‘‘circumstances’’ by the words, ‘‘may be
shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances do not affect its
admissibility’’.

Similarly, in a paper written for the 1994 proceedings of the ULCC,
‘‘Computer-Produced Records In Court Proceedings’’, (Ken Chasse,
online: <http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/index.cfm?
sec=1994&sub=1994ac>), I concluded (at para. 82):

See, for example, the following decisions: R. v. Felderhof (2005), C.C.C.
(3d) 34, [2005] O.J. No. 4151 (Ont. S.C.) [Felderhof]; Setak, supra note 34;
Waltson, supra note 39; Matheson v. Barnes & I.C.B.C., [1981] 1 W.W.R.
435 (B.C.S.C.); Adderley v. Breamer, [1968] 1 O.R. 621 (Ont. H.C.)
[ Adderley ]; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.
Obodzinsky, [2003] F.C.J. no. 370 (F.C.A.); R. v. Monkhouse, [1987] A.J.
1031 (Alta. C.A.); Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.L. (2003)
39 R.F.L. (5th) 54, [2003] O.J. 1722 (Ont. S.C.) [Catholic Children’s Aid].

R. v. Gregoire (1998), 130 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Grimba and
Wilder (1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 469 (Ont. Co.Ct.); R. v. Martin (1977), 8 C.R.
(5th) 246 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Wilcox (2001), 152 C.C.C. (3d) 157 (N.S.C.A.)
[Wilcox]; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Oberlander, [1999] 1 F.C. 88, [1998] F.C.J. No.1380 (T.D.); Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Skomatchuk, [2006] F.C.J. No. 926 (T.D.);
Sunila (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 331 (N.S.S.C.) [Sunila]; R. v. Marini, [2006]
O.J. No. 4057 (S.C.J.); R. v. Baker (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 314 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Scheel (1978), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 31 (Ont. C.A.) [Scheel].
Setak, supra note 34; Aynsley v. Toronto General Hospital, [1968] 1 O.R.
425 (Ont. H.C.) affirmed [1969] 2 O.R. 829, affirmed [1972] S.C.R. 435
(sub nom. Toronto Gen. Hospital Trustees v. Matthews) [Aynsley];
Adderley, supra note 42; Palter Cap Co. Ltd. v. Great West Life Assurance
Co., [1936] O.R. 341, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 304 (Ont. C.A.); Conley v. Conley,
[1968] 2 O.R. 677, 70 D.L.R. (2d) 352 (Ont. C.A.); B.C. v. Harris, [2003]
B.C.J. No. 1897 (B.C.S.C.); Newmarket (Town) v. Halton Recycling Ltd.,
[2006] O.J. No. 2233 (Ont. S.C.); R.obb v. St. Joseph’s Health Care Centre,
[1999] O.J. 523 (Ont. Ct. G.D.) [Robb]; Catholic Children’s Aid, supra note
42; Johnson v. Lutz et al. (1930), 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (C.A. of New
York); Palmer v. Hoffman, supra note 34.
Felderhof, supra note 42; Setak, supra note 34; Vanlerberghe, supra note
39; R. v. West, [2001] O.J. 3413 (Ont. S.C.) [West]; Robb, ibid; Re: S.V.,
[2002] S.J. No. 714 (Sask. Q.B.) [Re: S.V.].

46

Northern Wood Preserves Ltd. v. Hall Corp. Shipping, [1972] 3 O.R. 751,
aff’d. 2 O.R. (2d) 335 (Ont. CA.); Setak, supra note 34; R. v. Biasi (No. 2)
(1981), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 563 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. McLarty (No. 3) (1978),
45 C.C.C. (2d) 184 (Ont. Co. Ct.); West, ibid.

47

Compare McMullen, supra note 15, with Vanlerberghe, supra note 39;
note the difference when expert testimony is used as in Vanlerberghe.

48

Felderhof, supra note 42; R. v. Laverty (No. 2) (1979), 47 C.C.C. (2d) 60
(Ont. C.A.); Robb v. St. Joseph’s Health Care Centre, [1999] O.J. 2003
(Ont. S.C.); Catholic Children’s Aid, supra note 42; Re: S.V., supra note 45.

49

Compare McMullen, supra note 15, with Bell and Bruce, supra note 16.

50

A contrary opinion as to the state of hearsay issues attendant to electronic
records is given by John D. Gregory, in, ‘‘Canadian Electronic Commerce
Legislation’’ supra note 4 at 328 et seq., whereat the author states: ‘‘The
rules on hearsay are generally accepted to present no special problems for
the admission of electronic records’’. For further quotation from and
analysis of this article, see infra note 108 in part 10, ‘‘Answering John
Gregory’s Attack’’. And in regard to John Gregory himself, see also notes
28, 52, and 91.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent formulation of the best
evidence rule is now more than 25 years old: see Cotroni and Papalia,
supra note 7.

In a paper, as part of the 1995 proceedings of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (the ULCC), entitled: ‘‘Proposals for Uniform Electronic
Evidence Act ’’, by John D. Gregory of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario and Ed Tollefson, Q.C., of the federal Department of
Justice, online: <http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/index.cfm?
sec=1995&sub=1995ad>, under the heading, ‘‘Problems With ComputerProduced Evidence’’ (paras. 89 to 99), the authors conclude:
[99] The conclusion that one can reach is that the provisions of
the Canada Evidence Act do not provide a particularly comfortable fit for computer-produced evidence. They were not prepared with the computer in mind, so their terminology is inappropriate or ill-defined. Having been prepared with the objective
of resolving particular problems, the relevant sections of the Act
reveal inconsistencies of approach and unwarranted overlapping
which affects all forms of documentary evidence, not just computer-produced evidence.

Before computers were used to create and store business records, the
words ‘‘record’’ and ‘‘document’’ could be used interchangeably because
all records were in the form of paper documents. Separating the concepts
of the content of a record from the medium upon which it was stored
made necessary the use of a different word for each, that is, ‘‘record’’ for
the content of the record and ‘‘document’’ for the medium upon which
it was stored or written. Similarly, ‘‘data’’ makes a ‘‘record’’ which, when
stored on paper, becomes a ‘‘document’’. Then, to ruin this neat taxonomy, the CEA uses ‘‘document’’ in its electronic record provisions,
while most of the other Evidence Acts use ‘‘record’’. The CEA, however,
uses ‘‘record’’ in its business, banking, and microfilm record provisions.

45

51

52

●

The current rule has several areas of uncertainty that the case-bycase development of the law will not resolve for years.

●

Many solicitors have difficulty advising their clients about the
proper conduct of their businesses because of uncertainty about
the use of electronic records in litigation.

●

A very liberal use of electronic evidence may be unfair to someone
wishing to attack the reliability of the evidence; the onus of proof
of reliability should be on the proponent of evidence and not on its
opponent.

●

Current rules are based on inconsistent statutes and thus create a
diversity of law across Canada. Caselaw is not capable of resolving
this in the short run.

●

National and industry standards for the proper use of computer
technology are widely accepted and do not inspire fear of unduly
limiting the technology or systems to which they apply.

53

For example, subsection 30(1) of the CEA, supra note 1, subsection 35(2)
of the OEA, supra note 1, and subsection 42(2) of the BCEA, supra note
33.

54

CEA, supra note 1.

55

Subsection 35(4) of the OEA, supra note 1.

56

Supra note 11. In spite of its age, this book still contains the best available
treatment of the hearsay rule and best evidence rule issues arising from
electronic and pre-electronic records — see generally chapters 2 and 3,
pp. 44–119). The chapter titles and subheadings are, chapters 2, ‘‘The
Admissibility of Records Made Pursuant to a Business Duty’’, having
three major subdivisions, which are, ‘‘1. The Common Law Business
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule’’, (pp. 44–69); and ‘‘2. The Business Duty
Rule under the Uniform Evidence Act’’, (pp. 69–74), which is a reference
to the Uniform Evidence Act in Appendix 4, pp. 541–603, that concludes
the Report of the Federal/Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of
Evidence, (Toronto: Carswell; 1982) [Federal/Provincial Task Force],
being a report of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, and ‘‘(3) The
Continuing Availability of the Common Law Exception’’ (pp. 74-75). And
for chapter 3, ‘‘Statutory Provisions Governing Business Records’’, which
chapter provides a detailed analysis of the ‘‘American Origins of the
Canadian Statutory Business Records Provisions’’, and therefore of the
constituent elements of section 30 CEA, and of the ‘‘provincial enactments’’, and lastly of, ‘‘The Provisions of the Uniform Evidence Act ’’. As
these headings should imply, in these chapters substantial support can be
found for the above opinion that there are an unacceptably large number
of important, unanswered questions as to the interpretation and operation of section 30 of the CEA and its provincial and territorial counterparts (see notes 38 to 45 and accompanying text). See also, supra note 59.

57

Ibid., p. 85.

58

Note 8 accompanies the text (at p. 77) which states: ‘‘Although some may
see the various statutory provisions as pre-emptive codes, it is important
to be aware that courts have frequently been willing to impose interpretations, particularly limiting interpretations, based on the earlier common
law rules’’. The content of note 8 itself states: ‘‘ Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109 (1943) is an excellent example of this approach. In Aynsley v.
Toronto Gen. Hospital, [1968] 1 O.R. 425, affirmed [1969] 2 O.R. 829,
affirmed [1972] S.C.R. 435 (sub nom. Toronto Gen. Hospital Trustees v.
Matthews), Morand J. took a somewhat different approach, accepting
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admissibility under the statute but stating, ‘in dealing with the question
of weight the Judge will apply all of the old rules of evidence which have
stood the test of centuries’’’.
59

Seq: 20
Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\06_03\chasse.dat
Time: 17:44
Date: 27-NOV-07
Username: shirley.spalding

✄ REMOVE

Ewart, supra note 11, and accompanying text, discusses the subjective
nature of the ‘‘course of business’’ test as an aspect of the ‘‘dramatic
change from the common law position’’ (at 84) made by section 30 of the
CEA. He states of this dramatic change (at 85): ‘‘Gone is the requirement
that there be a strict duty to a third person; instead, a record made by
anyone conducting a business or undertaking, employer or sole proprietor as well as employee or casual assistant, is prima facie admissible if
made in the usual and ordinary course of that business or undertaking.
The standard is subjective to the business; admissibility is measured in
relation to the usual and ordinary course of the in question’’.

60

Supra note 22.

61

Ewart, supra note 13, at 53, whereat the author provides a comparative
list of the constituent elements of the common law rule, and the ‘‘Impact
of Ares ’’ [Ares v. Venner, supra note 3] upon each of the constituent
elements of the common law rule by way of a comparative listing of the
‘‘Traditional Rules’’ that made up the common law hearsay exception
before Ares (in left hand column) with the ‘‘Impact of Ares’’ upon each of
them (in the right hand column). A useful discussion of these points can
also be found in Federal/Provincial Task Force, supra note 56 at 390–401
(being ss. 29.11 & 29.12 of the Report), and elsewhere whereat the
decision in Ares v. Venner, supra note 3, is discussed. In the context of
criminal proceedings and generally in relation to the Canada Evidence
Act, see: E.G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Canada, 2nd
ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2006), at para. 16:15110, ‘‘Business
records’’.

62

Supra note 3.

63

Ibid., at 363.

64

licence and its conditions, and produced two affidavits attested to by the
Acting Licensing Administration. Flynn, Prov’l. Ct. J., held that the electronic record provisions of the Canada Evidence Act cannot by themselves admit a document into evidence. Admissibility must be found by
way of some other rule such as the business record provisions of section 30 of the CEA. The electronic record provisions merely answer any
objection based upon the best evidence rule. Note that subsections 31.2(1) and (2) of the CEA were accepted as being alternative means
of answering such objections — see paras. 23 and 26.

[1965] A.C. 1001, [1964] 2 All E.R. 881, 48 Cr. App. R. 348 (H.L.).

65

See, for example, Davie Shipbuilding Ltd., v. Cargill Grain Ltd. (1975),
10 N.R. 347 (S.C.C.) at 358; C.P.R. v. City of Calgary, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 241
(Alta. C.A.) at 257-58; and Setak, supra note 34 at 755.

66

Ewart, supra, note 13, at the top of page 54, and the same list appears at
84, note 55, under the heading, ‘‘Changes from the Common Law
Admissibility Tests: An Overview’’. For the detailed analysis of how Ares
v. Venner redefined and updated the common law business records
exception to the hearsay rule, see: Ewart at 48–54; and for a detailed
analysis of the differences between this redefined common law exception
and the business records exception provided by s. 30 of the CEA, see
82–105.

67

Ewart, supra note 13, at 84-85.

68

Ibid.

69

CEA, supra note 1.

70

For a helpful analysis of the spoliation doctrine in Canada, along with a
review of the caselaw to 1998, see: Craig Jones, ‘‘The Spoliation Doctrine
and Expert Evidence in Civil Trials’’ (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 293–325.

71

Of the 10 Evidence Acts that use the ‘‘usual and ordinary course of
business’’ phrase in their business record provisions, five use the double
phrase, namely the Evidence Acts of British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova
Scotia, Ontario, and Saskatchewan.

72

In regard to electronic records, no cases could be found that would
prevent these interpretations of the business record provisions. And more
importantly, these suggested interpretations are not overly venturesome,
but rather both necessary and modest when compared to the great
modernization the Supreme Court of Canada has brought to the hearsay
rule and its exceptions; see the Court’s decisions cited supra note 35, and
infra note 76.

73

Section 31.2 of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsections 34.1(5), (5.1) of the
OEA, supra note 1.

74

Section 30 of the CEA, ibid, and section 35 of the OEA, ibid. Note that
‘‘business’’ includes all types of commercial and institutional activity
including that of governments.

75

In Quebec, instead of appearing within an Evidence Act, comparable
provisions can be found in the Articles of the Civil Code of Quebec,
(Book Seven, ‘‘Evidence’’), L.Q., 1991, c. 64, and in An Act to Establish a
Legal Framework for Information Technology, R.S.Q., c. C-1.1.

76

Both supra note 1.

77

See R. v. Morgan [2002] N.J. No. 15 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.), at paras. 6 and 20 to
27. Morgan was charged with violating a fishing licence condition. A
Crown witness tendered a computer generated copy of the fishing

In addition, there is the authentication rule. Subsection 34.1(4) of the
OEA states: ‘‘The person seeking to introduce an electronic record has
the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting
a finding that the electronic record is what the person claims it to be’’.
Section 31.1 of the CEA uses a similar wording.
78

As to the ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ being a subjective test,
subjective to the business from which the record in question comes, see
Ewart, supra note 13, at 85; and supra note 38; see supra note 56 for
comments on Ewart.

79

Ewart, supra note 13, discusses the subjective nature of the ‘‘course of
business’’ test as an aspect of the ‘‘dramatic change from the common law
position’’ (at 84) made by section 30 of the CEA. He states of this
dramatic change (at 85): ‘‘Gone is the requirement that there be a strict
duty to a third person; instead, a record made by anyone conducting a
business or undertaking, employer or sole proprietor as well as employee
or casual assistant, is prima facie admissible if made in the usual and
ordinary course of that business or undertaking. The standard is subjective to the business; admissibility is measured in relation to the usual and
ordinary course of the business in question’’.

80

Supra note 27.

81

Supra note 13, at 53; see supra note 61.

82

See the definitions of ‘‘business’’ in the business record provisions: subsection 30(12) of the CEA, supra note 1; and subsection 35(1) of the OEA,
supra note 1.

83

The ‘‘electronic record’’ provisions of the federal and provincial Evidence
Acts date from May 1, 2000, when sections 31.1–31.8 CEA became operative, and are therefore too new to have accumulated defining court
decisions. Other than Morgan, supra note 77, the two other available
decisions that refer to the electronic record provisions provide no analysis; see: Gratton, supra note 14, at paras. 108 to 125; Bellingham, supra
note 14 at paras. 26 to 28.
The ‘‘business record’’ provisions date from the late 1960s, but still have
not produced judicial decisions that clearly define or exemplify their
two key tests sufficiently so that one knows exactly what foundation
evidence to marshall in preparation for legal proceedings. However, the
following decisions provide a representation of the available caselaw that
elucidates the issues; see: McMullen, supra note 15; Bell and Bruce, supra
note 16; Wilcox, supra note 43; R. v. Penno (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 266,
76 D.L.R. (3d) 529, 37 C.R.N.S. 391 (B.C.C.A.); Scheel, supra note 43; R. v.
Bicknell (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 545 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Sanghi (1972),
6 C.C.C. (2d) 123, at 128–132 (N.S.C.A.). Pre-existing the business record
provisions of the Evidence Acts is the business record exception to the
rule against hearsay evidence at common law, which may still be used
together with its Evidence Act counterpart; see: Ares v. Venner, supra
note 3; Monkhouse, supra note 42; Sunila, supra note 43. A third route
to admissibility as evidence is by way of the ‘‘principled exception to the
rule against hearsay evidence’’, which exception is explained in Starr,
supra note 39, (particularly paragraphs 199–201, reproduced infra, in
part 9 ‘‘Contradictory caselaw — civil versus criminal proceedings), and
modified by R. v. Khelawon, [2006] S.C.J., No. 57, 2006 SCC 57, and
exemplified for records as admissible hearsay evidence by, Wilcox, supra
note 43, at paras. 59 to 76.
That many of the uncertainties of section 30 of the CEA have yet to be
resolved was also the conclusion of Ewart, supra, note 13, in 1984. He
states (at 83): ‘‘Finally, perhaps because of the breadth of its intended
impact, section 30 contains a number of significant ambiguities, many of
which have yet to find definitive resolutions. The section is not an easy
one to interpret; there remains a considerable degree of understatement
in the sentiments expressed by Pennell J. of the Ontario Supreme Court
early on in the life of section 30: ‘I have engaged in infrequent safaris
into [section 30’s] various subsections and I have found an exploration of
the whole sweep of the section is one not altogether free of difficulty.’
[Re Martin and R. (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 224 (Ont. H.C.) at p. 230]’’. It is
suggested that not only has this state of caselaw affairs not changed since
1984, but also that this same uncertainty and lack of resolution of
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important issues can still be said of the business record provisions of the
provincial and territorial Evidence Acts, as well.
84

See: section 31.5 of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsection 34.1(8) of the
OEA, supra note 1.

85

Note the words, ‘‘under any rule of law’’, which mean that subsection 34.1(8) of the OEA, supra note 1, and section 31.5 of the CEA, supra
note 1, apply not only to the electronic record provisions, but also to
issues of the admissibility of electronic records under the business record
and banking record provisions, and other document provisions of the
Evidence Acts, and also to their common law counterparts. Also, subsection 34.1(3) of the OEA states that, ‘‘a court may have regard to evidence
adduced under this section in applying any common law or statutory
rule relating to the admissibility of records’’. Even though this provision is
a copy of subsection 2(2) of the UEEA, supra note 2, it has not a counterpart in the CEA.
‘‘CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005’’ is its designation in Canada’s National Standards System, which states that it is standard ‘‘72.34’’, developed by the
Canadian General Standards Board (the CGSB) and approved in 2005 by
the Standards Council of Canada, the coordinating body of the System.
The CGSB, a government agency within Public Works and Government
Services Canada, has been accredited by the Standards Council of
Canada as a national standards development organization. The process
by which such national standards are created and maintained in Canada
is described within the Standard itself. See also supra note 27.

87

See: subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA, supra note 1; and subsection 34.1(6)
of the OEA, supra note 1.

88

Consider whether evidentiary inferences are created by subsection 4(2) of
the UEEA. It appears to create an evidentiary inference by way of the
words, ‘‘is the record for the purposes of the best evidence rule’’. And
more definitely so do the words in subsection 4(1), stating that ‘‘the best
evidence rule . . . is satisfied in respect of the electronic record on proof of
. . .’’. The Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 25(1) states: ‘‘Where an
enactment provides that a document is evidence of a fact without anything in the context to indicate that the document is conclusive evidence,
then, in any judicial proceedings, the document is admissible in evidence
and the fact is deemed to be established in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary’’. (There does not appear to be a comparable provision in
the Ontario Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11.) For such purposes, is
there a distinction between the wording of subsections 4(2) and (1) —
between ‘‘for the purposes of the best evidence rule’’ and ‘‘the best
evidence rule is satisfied’’? The enacted counterparts in section 31.2 of the
CEA, supra note 1, and subsections 34.1(5), (6) of the OEA, supra note 1,
use the same two phrases, but subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA also contains
the words, ‘‘in the absence of evidence to the contrary’’, while subsection 34.1(6) of the OEA does not.

89

Supra note 2.

90

This distinction between printout and its electronic source was actually
recognized by the courts almost 20 years before the electronic record
provisions were enacted; see McMullen, supra note 15, affirming
42 C.C.C. (2d) 67 (Ont. H.C.); Bell and Bruce, supra note 16. Specifically,
in Bell and Bruce, Weatherston J.A., delivering the judgment of the
Ontario Court of Appeal stated (at 380): ‘‘ McMullen is authority for the
proposition that information stored in a computer is capable of being a
‘record kept in a financial institution’, and that the computer print-out is
capable of being a copy of that record, notwithstanding its change in
form. It is not authority for the proposition that the stored information is
the only record, or that a computer print-out is only a copy of that
record’’. [emphasis in the original] And at 381: ‘‘There was some suggestion that one of the banks had the new ‘on-line’ system, under which the
information stored in the computer is not, or is not necessarily, erased
when a monthly statement is produced. I do not consider that to be
important. There is no reason why a bank may not have a ‘record’ in two
or more different forms, just as it might have a duplicate set of books’’.

91

The first interpretation is that favoured by John D. Gregory, General
Counsel, Policy Division, Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario)
(And see: www.euclid.ca). He acted as Chair of the committee that prepared the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (the UEEA) for the Uniform
Law Conference of Canada (the ULCC), and therefore later had comparable responsibility for bringing to life the electronic record provisions of
the OEA. The other two participants in drafting the UEEA were federal
Department of Justice lawyers, who also aided in preparing the electronic
document provisions of the CEA, being Part 3 of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 [‘‘PIPEDA’’],
Parts 2 (‘‘Electronic Documents’’) and Part 3 (‘‘Amendments to the
Canada Evidence Act ’’) came into force on May 1, 2000, supra note 2.
John Gregory also added to his many years of work in this area of the law
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by providing substantial critical analysis and helpful comment upon the
more ‘‘legal content’’ parts (particularly section 5, ‘‘Legal requirements for
electronic records as documentary evidence’’) of the new National Standard of Canada, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence CAN/
CGSB-72.34-2005, (supra notes 27 and 86), during the dozens of our
meetings of the Canadian General Standards Board’s Committee on
Micrographics and Image Management that drafted the standard. See
further notes, 25, 46, 48, and 102.
92

Supra note 77.

93

In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 11th ed. (London: Sweet &
Maxwell; 1962), at p. 25: ‘‘Lord Halsbury states however, that he has, on
more than one occasion, said that the worst person to construe a statute
is the person who is responsible for its drafting, for he is much disposed
to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which
in fact he has employed’’. Cited in support are: Hilder v. Dexter, [1902]
A.C. 474; Herron v. Rathmines, etc., [1892] A.C. 498, 501. The passage
continues on page 26: ‘‘But it is unquestionably a rule that what may be
called the parliamentary history of an enactment is not admissible to
explain its meaning. Its language can be regarded only as the language of
the three Estates of the realm, and the meaning attached to it by its
framers or by individual members of one of those Estates cannot control
the construction of it. Indeed, the inference to be drawn from comparing
the language of the Act with the declared intention of its framers would
be that the difference between the two was not accidental but intentional’’.

94

It is the intention of Parliament (in regard to the CEA amendments), or of
the enacting legislature (in the case of a provincial or territorial Evidence
Act or other legislative amendment) that should guide judicial interpretation, not that of legislative draftspersons or those who aided in the
preparation of the Bill before it became a legislated Act: R. v. Hasselwander, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 389, 81 C.C.C. (3d) 471, at 478; United Nurses of
Alberta v. Alberta (A.G.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 901, 71 C.C.C. (3d) 225 at 258, 89
D.L.R. (4th) 609. More recently in, R. v. W.(R.E.) (2006), 79 O.R. (3d)
1 (Ont. C.A.) Rosenberg J.A., in delivering the judgment of the Court, in
interpreting paragraph 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C.
2002, c. 1, referred (at p. 12) to the statement of the Minister of Justice on
introducing the Act on second reading, and (at p. 13) to the testimony of
Professor Nicholas Bala before the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (February 16, 2000, at 1545) in
determining the intention of Parliament. But there is no resort to the
views of lawyers who drafted or otherwise prepared the Bills that become
Acts, except in the form of testimony before a Parliamentary committee.
One of the most important examples of differences between drafters’
intentions and the courts’ interpretation of federal legislation applicable
to criminal proceedings is the ‘‘ Milgaard procedure’’ under subsection 9(2) of the CEA (‘‘previous statement of witness not proved
adverse’’), which was held to result in leave to cross-examine one’s own
witness on an inconsistent statement before the jury, instead of such
cross-examination being only a voir dire procedure in aid of seeking a
declaration of adversity under subsection 9(1) of the CEA: R. v. Milgaard
(1971), 2 C.C.C. (2d) 206, at 221 (Sask. C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C.
refused (1972) 4 C.C.C. (2d) 566n. This Milgaard procedure for subsection 9(2) of the CEA, was quoted with implied approval in R. v. McInroy
and Rouse, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 588, 42 C.C.C. (2d) 481, at 485-86, and 496
(concluding paragraph of the decision of Martland J. approving of the
cross-examination allowed under subsection 9(2)). See also, Professor
Ron Delisle’s earlier article (Judge Delisle as he then was), ‘‘Witnesses —
Competence and Credibility’’ (1978) 16 Osgoode Hall L.J. 337, at
345–47, whereat he reproduces portions of the testimony of the Minister
of Justice, John Turner, and of the Director of the Criminal Law Section,
John Scollin (later Mr. Justice Scollin of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s
Bench), before the Standing Committee for Justice and Legal Affairs on
January 28, 1969 (at 109–12), being testimony in support of the Bill that
added subsection 9(2) to the CEA. This testimony is cited in support of
the author’s view that (at 345), ‘‘despite R. v. Milgaard, supra, the crossexamination mentioned in subsection 9(2) ought to take place on a voir
dire ’’. The same view is put forward by Professor Delisle in an earlier
article, ‘‘Witnesses — Now and Later’’ (1976) 34 C.R.N.S. 1, at 7-8, which
view was adopted by Langdon J. in R. v. Cronshaw and Dupon (1976),
33 C.C.C. (2d) 183 at 201 (Ont. Prov’l. Ct.), quoting from the article.

95

Subsection 4(1) of the UEEA; subsection 31.2(1) of the CEA, supra note 1;
subsection 34.1(5.1) of the OEA, supra note 1.

96

However, the hearsay rule may provide a more appropriate test than the
best evidence rule.

97

Supra note 11.
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99

See: McMullen, supra note 15; Belland Bruce, supra note 16. Ewart makes
the distinction (supra, note 13 at 134) that in the case of the ‘‘relied upon
printout’’, Bell and Bruce ‘‘effectively overrules’’ the McMullen standard,
(which distinction is not agreed with). Specifically, in Bell and Bruce,
Weatherston J.A., delivering the judgment of the Ontario Court of
Appeal, stated (at 380): ‘‘ McMullen is authority for the proposition that
information stored in a computer is capable of being a ‘record kept in a
financial institution’, and that the computer print-out is capable of being
a copy of that record, notwithstanding its change in form. It is not
authority for the proposition that the stored information is the only
record, or that a computer print-out is only a copy of that record’’.
[emphasis in the original] And at 381: ‘‘There was some suggestion that
one of the banks had the new ‘on-line’ system, under which the information stored in the computer is not, or is not necessarily, erased when a
monthly statement is produced. I do not consider that to be important.
There is no reason why a bank may not have a ‘record’ in two or more
different forms, just as it might have a duplicate set of books’’.
SOR/2005-30, registered February 1, 2005.
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Vol. 139, no. 4; pages 207–211. Note that section 57 of PIPEDA, supra
note 2, added subsection 32(2) to the CEA, supra note 1, which states
that copies of documents published in the Canada Gazette are admissible in evidence as proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, of
the originals and of their contents.

101

S.O. 2000, c. 17.

102

See notes 9 and 10 supra, and accompanying text.

103

See Ares v. Venner, supra note 3, and the cases that have applied it to
issues concerning business records as evidence.
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Supra note 13, at 85, note 57 of Ewart’s text.

105

Supra note 39.

106

Being Part I, Constitution Act, 1982, enacted by the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), c. 11 R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 44, proclaimed in force
April 17, 1982 (hereinafter, ‘‘the Charter’’).

107

The ‘‘fair trial’’ provision of the Charter, paragraph 11(d), applies only to,
‘‘Any person charged with an offence’’.

108

Supra note 4. For other references to its author, see notes 28, 50, and 91.

109

Note 279 in the original text: ‘‘In the words of Wigmore on Evidence,
cited in J.D. Ewart, Documentary Evidence in Canada, supra note 270, at
13. Compare the language of the Civil Code of Quebec, [citing articles
2837 and 2838]. The Code is online at: <http://
www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ccq/en/index.html>’’.

110

Note 280 in the original text: ‘‘See for example his opening contribution
to the Uniform Law process, ‘Computer-produced Records in Court
Proceedings’, [1994] Proceedings of the Uniform Law Conference,
online at: <http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/index.cfm?
secW1994&subW1994ac>’’.

111

Note 281 in the original text: (1978), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 67, affirmed (1979),
47 C.C.C. (2d) 499, 25 O.R. (2d) 301, 100 D.L.R. (3d) 671 (Ont. C.A.).

112

Note 282 in the original text: ‘‘Ewart, Documentary Evidence in
Canada, supra, n. 270, at 67’’.

113

Supra note 84.

